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ABSTRACT 
The groupthink psychological phenomenon prevalent in the homeland security enterprise 
is a significant threat to the United States. Homeland security is vulnerable to groupthink 
because its leaders frequently share similar backgrounds, work histories, and world-
views. This similarity minimizes the chance of outside perspectives being introduced to 
the decision-making process, which insulates leadership from external ideas. This 
research project asks, “Has groupthink influenced the homeland security enterprise and if 
so, what are the implications of this phenomenon?” It examines case studies of decisions 
made by government in-groups to determine if the antecedent conditions and symptoms 
of groupthink are present and if the resulting fiascos are caused by groupthink. 
Furthermore, it analyzes Irvin Janis’s original remedies, which have successfully 
alleviated groupthink in the past, and it offers recommendations to mitigate this 
phenomenon. Leaders who wish to alleviate groupthink should promote a culture in 
which employees are encouraged to play the role of devil’s advocate by offering 
alternatives to organizational decisions and commonly held assumptions. Homeland 
security can reduce groupthink by employing Janis’s remedies and encouraging critical 
thinking, innovation, and imagination to bolster the national security of the United States. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The groupthink psychological phenomenon widespread throughout the homeland security 
enterprise is a significant threat to the national security of the United States. 
Nevertheless, the existence of groupthink and its influence on homeland security has not 
been thoroughly studied or evaluated. To counter the ever-evolving threats to the nation, 
the homeland security enterprise must employ imagination, innovation, critical thinking, 
and devil’s advocacy that are the antithesis of groupthink.  
This research project asks, “Has groupthink influenced the homeland security 
enterprise and if so, what are the implications of this phenomenon?” It also identifies the 
antecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink in the homeland security enterprise, 
examines the patterns of evidence indicating the extent to which this psychological 
phenomenon is occurring, and it analyzes how groupthink is influencing the national 
security of the United States. This thesis project also offers recommendations on how to 
mitigate groupthink to homeland security leaders and reformers.  
THE GROUPTHINK PHENOMENON  
The term groupthink was first used in a 1952 Fortune magazine article by 
William H. Whyte, Jr. Whyte discussed “rationalized conformity” in government 
organizations and decision-making groups that he saw as a threat to individuality and 
innovation. The seminal work on groupthink theory was created in 1972, when 
psychologist Irving L. Janis published Victims of Groupthink. This essential work 
examined historic government policy decisions influenced by groupthink. It further 
examined decisions that were the antithesis of groupthink, on which leaders took steps to 
counter this phenomenon.  
According to Janis’s theory, groupthink occurs when the members of an in-group 
prize their membership in this faction more than the quality of the decision or the 
decision’s consequences. Janis theorized that the in-group frequently sanctions a directive 
leader’s preconceived agenda, and censors their own doubts, disagreements, or 
alternative courses of action. Groups that engage in groupthink reject outside opinions, 
 xi 
and even in the face of disastrous consequences, they often ardently defend the faulty 
decisions made by the group.  
Janis identified certain antecedent conditions—really, structural faults in an 
organization—that may lead to groupthink. Such antecedent conditions as insulation of 
the decision-making in-group, a lack of impartial leadership and established methods and 
procedures, and the homogeneity of the decision-making in-group, are present in the 
modern homeland security enterprise.  
This theory also identified eight symptoms of groupthink, many of which are also 
readily apparent in the home security enterprise including the “belief in inherent morality; 
stereotyped views of out-groups; self-appointed “mindguards”; illusion of unanimity; 
self-censorship; collective rationalization; direct pressure on dissenters; and the illusion 
of invulnerability.” Janis’s groupthink theory contends, “the more frequently a group 
displays the symptoms, the worse will be the quality of its decisions.”  
OVERVIEW OF GROUPTHINK IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
The homeland security enterprise displays the symptoms and consequences of 
groupthink in the poor quality of the decisions made by many of its leadership in-groups 
and the continuous mismanagement and failures of the organizations. These failures can 
result in extremely low morale among career employees; the continuous succession of 
insulated senior leadership incarnations, and the lack of a clearly defined homeland 
security mission that each succession of leadership redefines.  
The homeland security enterprise is vulnerable to groupthink because frequently 
leadership in-groups share similar backgrounds and belief systems. This homogeneity 
increases the insulation of leadership and it minimizes the introduction of outside 
perspectives, dissenting opinions, and alternative viewpoints from being introduced into 
the decision-making process. Career employees who are subject-matter experts are often 
viewed by leadership in-groups as inferiors or interchangeables who merely serve the 
leadership. Moreover, leadership in-groups commonly do not have an interest in actually 
reforming the status quo unless they are forced to act.  
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Homeland security leadership in the grips of groupthink endangers the national 
security of the United States when such officials ignore alternatives to their decisions. 
“Mindguards” within homeland security aggressively interdict the alternative views of 
employees who do not engage in the current cycle of groupthink and these employees are 
often punished, isolated, or deposed by the current leadership and its “prevailing 
wisdom.”  
FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Furthermore, to promote and manage homeland security effectively and to 
prevent groupthink, leadership should select the members of decisions-making groups 
from diverse social, ethnic, economic, political, and occupational backgrounds. Janis’s 
recommendations for overcoming groupthink affirm that each group member has the 
obligation to act as a critical evaluator or devil’s advocate that airs objections and doubts. 
Leaders should accept criticism and discourage the members from soft-pedaling their 
disagreements; each group member should seek input from “trusted associates” and 
outside “experts” to challenge the views of the core members. Members should be 
encouraged by leadership to engage in constructive criticism, deductive reasoning, and 
devil’s advocacy when debating and questioning policies and decisions made by the 
group. 
Leaders can mitigate groupthink on a case-by-case basis by fostering an 
organizational culture that encourages employees to play the vital role of devil’s 
advocate, offering their varied perspectives pertaining to agency policies, programs, and 
commonly held assumptions. Leaders who wish to diminish groupthink should employ 
Janis’s framework and remedies, and promote critical thinking, innovation, and 
imagination to strengthen national security.  
Furthermore, history has demonstrated that significant change in the U.S. 
government typically occurs only following a tremendous crisis. Reform in homeland 
security occurred subsequent to the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, the attacks 
on September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina. These tragic incidents prompted 
homeland security reformers to enact change in the security posture of the nation. 
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Reformers must be ready for the period immediately following the next crisis to 
implement Janis’s framework to mitigate the internal threat of groupthink that has made 
much of the homeland security enterprise infective.  
 xiv 
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The greatest threat to the homeland security of the United States (U.S.) is not a 
multinational terrorist organization or a large-scale natural disaster; it is the pervasive 
environment of groupthink, a psychological phenomenon endemic throughout the 
homeland security enterprise. The groupthink phenomenon has propelled the homeland 
security enterprise into an unfocused mission space continually redefined within the 
groupthink framework of the current political in-group. Each wave of political leadership 
claims to be reforming the dysfunctional homeland security environment while simply 
refocusing the groupthink atmosphere upon the next predetermined agenda. The 
homeland security mission must be fluid to counter new threats and to accomplish its 
mission of protecting the nation. Real and useful adaptation comes with fresh 
perspectives and new ideas. However, homeland security should not be susceptible to 
continuous change that is the byproduct of the momentary political environment.  
Those charged with protecting the homeland can look to their own worst cases for 
examples of groupthink in action. The Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States noted of the run-up to 9/11, “The most 
important failure was one of imagination.” The commission found that the nation’s 
leaders did not understand the threat that al Qaeda posed, and therefore, underestimated 
it. As a group, they never imagined that the 9/11 scenario could occur as the homeland 
security assets were focused on the threat outside of the nation and an attack occurring 
domestically was unforeseen. Just as U.S. military and government officials discounted 
the threat from the Empire of Japan leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, before 9/11, 
senior government officials fell victim to groupthink and ignored the warning signs 
because they assumed that al Qaeda and its leaders were not advanced enough to pose a 
legitimate threat to the U.S. homeland.1 The homeland security enterprise was 
substantially reorganized—including the forming of the Department of Homeland 
1 Thomas Kean, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).  
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Security (DHS)—in part to eradicate groupthink. Homeland security officials thus should 
be particularly aware of the pernicious effects of groupthink. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research project asks, “Has groupthink influenced the homeland security 
enterprise, and if so, what are the implications of this phenomenon?” It analyzes how 
groupthink can be the result of a groups’ dichotomous, “us-versus-them” identity and 
how it affects the organizational structure of the homeland security enterprise, as well as 
the national security of the United States.2 This research project employs a method of 
study known as process tracing, which uses qualitative case study research in the social 
sciences. It is defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.”3  
Today’s homeland security enterprise is especially vulnerable to the groupthink 
phenomenon because agency leadership often originates from similar backgrounds, 
including political insiders, former military, and law enforcement. This homogeneity 
minimizes the chance of any outside perspectives being introduced or seriously 
considered and tends to insulate the leadership from external ideas, dissenting opinions, 
and alternative viewpoints. Leadership affected by groupthink ignores alternatives to 
current agendas, and dehumanizes and discredits individuals or groups within and outside 
the organization that have different perspectives.4 “Mindguards” within the organization 
aggressively interdict constructive criticism, innovative ideas, and devil’s advocacy that 
further isolate leadership. Employees who do not engage in the current cycle of 
groupthink are often punished, isolated, or deposed by leadership.5 
2 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory 
Perspective,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009): 537–559, http://sethschwartz.info/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Identity-and-Terrorism1.pdf. 
3 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (2011): 
823–830, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856702. 
4 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd rev ed. 
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982).  
5 Ibid., 40–41. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An enormous amount of literature explores groupthink, including books, journal 
articles, and laboratory reports from the scientific, medical, academic, private sector, and 
government communities. While these sources provide hypotheses and case studies, few 
mention homeland security specifically, although many are focused on political 
decisions, government fiascos, first responders, and the intelligence community. Much of 
this literature can be used in the process of identifying the antecedent conditions and the 
symptoms of groupthink in the homeland security enterprise. It can also be used to 
analyze the patterns of evidence as to the extent to which this psychological phenomenon 
is occurring, how it is affecting the national security of the United States, and how to 
mitigate the threat of groupthink in homeland security. 
Research suggests that few quantitative models measure the effect of groupthink 
on homeland security. Therefore, in this thesis, the analysis is based on qualitative data 
collected and analyzed to assess the phenomena’s impact. Literature provided by the 
scientific, medical, academic, private sector, and government communities assist in the 
research and analysis in this thesis project. The four categories chosen for this review are 
based on how groupthink affects organizational structures throughout society with a 
focus on government institutions. These categories include groupthink’s origins and 
applications, groupthink in government, groupthink remedies, solutions and mitigating 
factors, and groupthink’s relation to social identity theory.  
1. Groupthink’s Origins and Applications 
In 1972, social psychologist Irving L. Janis produced the seminal work on 
groupthink theory, Victims of Groupthink, which traced the phenomenon in foreign 
policy decisions and “fiascos,” such as in Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs, and the Korean 
and Vietnam wars. It also discussed government groups designed to avoid groupthink, 
such as in the Marshall Plan and the Kennedy Administration’s management of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.6 A decade later, Janis expanded his hypothesis in the book, 
6 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).  
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Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, in which he revised 
his original work and added content including a new case study of the Watergate cover-
up.7 The problem arose when foreign policymaking insiders, who prized their 
membership in this elite group more than the outcome of any particular decision, 
swallowed doubts or disagreements rather than disturbing the clubby air of prevailing 
wisdom.  
Janis continued to publish about the perils of going along to get along, perhaps 
because groupthink did not abate in the intervening years. Janis believed that “the more 
frequently a group displays the symptoms of groupthink; the worse will be the quality of 
its decisions.”8 Indeed, groupthink has withstood the test of time. In his paper, “Alive and 
Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research,” James K. Esser presents an 
overview of groupthink theory research over the past quarter of a century. This survey 
includes analysis of case studies of groupthink including Janis’s original historical cases 
studies of groupthink fiascos, such as Pearl Harbor and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and 
newer case studies, such as Esser’s and J. L. Lindoerfer’s examination of how groupthink 
influenced the space shuttle Challenger accident.9 The author discusses the future of 
groupthink research and he asserts that it has “considerable heuristic value” because it 
continues to inspire research, hypothesis, and theoretical ideas.10 This article’s analysis 
of the historical case studies of groupthink offers a different and critical evaluation of 
these events. The resulting laboratory tests conducted supported Janis’s original theories 
but also update them to make them relevant to the homeland security focus of this thesis 
project.  
7 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. 
8 Ibid., 174–177. 
9 James K. Esser and Joanne S. Lindoerfer, “Groupthink and the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: 
Toward a Quantitative Case Analysis,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2, no. 3 (1989): 167–177, 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=4f624538-deaf-463e-
bd3d-330e5a40a775%40sessionmgr114&hid=115. 
10 James K. Esser, “Alive and Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73, no. 2 (1998): 116–141, http://liquid 
briefing.com/twiki/pub/Dev/RefEsser1998/alive_and_well_after_25_years.pdf. 
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Ahlfinger and Esser, in their article, “Testing the Groupthink Model: Effects of 
Promotional Leadership and Conformity Predisposition,” tested two hypotheses derived 
from groupthink theory in a laboratory setting. These tests included the full range of 
groupthink symptoms. It questioned why groups whose leaders promoted their own 
personal preconceived agendas would be more likely to fall victim to groupthink than 
groups with leaders who did not promote their own plans. Consequently, the study found 
that groups with leaders who pressed their own agendas “produced more symptoms of 
groupthink, discussed fewer facts, and reached a decision more quickly,” than groups 
with leaders who did not engage in this practice.  
Similarly, in many divisions of homeland security, the leadership has become 
autocratic in its management techniques. Senior leaders put forth their own agendas and 
dissent or opposing opinions is dealt with harshly. The study concluded that groupthink 
research is hampered by measurement problems, which, in turn, suggests why groupthink 
studies are often qualitative in nature rather than quantitative, and case studies are used to 
identify the symptoms of groupthink.11 Moreover, considering the quantitative 
measurement difficulty outlined in this article, most groupthink research projects, as well 
as this thesis, undertake a qualitative paradigm utilizing case studies to investigate the 
existence of groupthink in the homeland security enterprise.  
Many social scientists oppose Janis’s work and they have made interesting 
counterarguments. These challenges to the groupthink theory include hypotheses, such as 
groupthink does not significantly affect the quality of the decision making, and that in 
certain circumstances, it can help rather than hinder the team-building process and 
performance. The article “A Comprehensive Empirical Investigation of the Relationships 
Among Variables of the Groupthink Model,” asserts that although the groupthink theory 
was introduced over 25 years ago, no agreement exists on the legitimacy of the theory. 
This investigation into Janis’s groupthink theory includes all the components of the 
original research. The study collected data from “64 four-person ad hoc groups,” which 
11 Noni Richardson Ahlfinger and James K. Esser, “Testing the Groupthink Model: Effects of 
Promotional Leadership and Conformity Predisposition,” Social Behavior and Personality 29, no. 1 (2001): 
31–41.  
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were videotaped and analyzed. The analysis of the experiments revealed Janis’s 
predictions were confirmed in only two out of 23 cases.12  
The Journal of Applied Psychology’s article, “The Organizational Application of 
Groupthink and its Limitations in Organizations,” written by Jin Nam Choi and Myung 
Un Kim, details a study that examines groupthink’s effect on 30 organizational teams 
faced with impending crises. The study reveals that the groupthink symptoms consist of 
two factors. The first is groupthink is not appreciably related to team performance and 
that it has an irrelevant effect on group performance. This study also reports that the 
symptoms of defective decision making are not predictors of team performance and team 
activities have a stronger impact on performance than groupthink. These studies are 
important because they demonstrate prospective positive implications of groupthink on 
organizational groups and they raise questions about veracity of the groupthink theory.13  
Groupthink is regularly studied in the business world and much of this research 
can be applied to the homeland security enterprise. Roland Bénabou, in his paper for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, “Groupthink: Collective Delusions in 
Organizations and Markets, “examines how collective beliefs and delusions arise and 
persist in “organizations such as teams, firms, bureaucracies and markets.” The author 
describes a “mutually assured delusion” principle that often gives rise to false perceptions 
of reality. This term also refers to organizations in which the leader’s reality or denial of 
reality trickles down to his underlings who without question mimic the leader’s views. 
This situation perfectly describes the state of the homeland security enterprise and how 
each consecutive leadership in-group arrives with a “mutually assured delusion” to 
further its own political agendas. Furthermore, once this “mutually assured delusion” is 
outlined, many homeland security leaders abandon past missions and practices in a vain 
12 Won-Woo Park, “A Comprehensive Empirical Investigation of the Relationships among Variables 
of the Groupthink Model,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 21, no. 8 (December 2000): 873–887, 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=17&sid=4f624538-deaf-
463e-bd3d-330e5a40a775%40sessionmgr114&hid=115. 
13 Jin Nam Choi and Myung Un Kim, “The Organizational Application of Groupthink and its 




                                                 
pursuit of the new leadership in-group’s agenda without question of what effect it may 
have on the security of the homeland.  
The author also discusses contagious exuberance, which can take hold of the 
financial markets and lead to groupthink investment frenzies that result in crashes. 
Bénabou distinguishes between the positive aspects of group morale and the harmful 
results of groupthink. In the aftermath of corporate and public policy disasters, it often 
emerges that participants fell prey to a collective form of willful blindness. Warnings are 
frequently ignored or met with denial; evidence is avoided, cast aside, or selectively 
reinterpreted, and dissenters are discouraged and shunned.14  
In the 1990s, al Qaeda was building its network and it was growing bolder with 
each successive attack. A progression of attacks in the early and mid-1990s led to the 
1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, followed by the attack on the 
U.S.S. Cole in 2000. During this period, the U.S. government appeared to be in a 
mutually assured delusion that assumed these attacks were isolated and the homeland 
would not be affected.15 Then, a new mindset abruptly replaced this rose-colored 
delusion. Following 9/11, the Bush administration engaged in a contagious exuberance 
that seized American society, and propelled the homeland security enterprise to the 
forefront of the War on Terror. This unprecedented frenzy of investment in U.S. 
homeland security during the early 2000s contributed to the serious financial problems of 
the U.S. government in the ensuing years.16 
2. Groupthink in Government 
Groupthink began as a theory about how the government works, or more 
specifically, how it does not work. Thus, much of the leading recognized research 
14 Roland Bénabou, “Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets,” The Review of 
Economic Studies 80, no. 2 (2013): 429–462, http://www.nber.org.libproxy.nps.edu/papers/w14764.pdf. 
15 Robert Windrem, “Al–Qaida Timeline: Plots and Attacks,” NBCNews.com, accessed August 5, 
2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4677978/ns/world_news–hunt_for_al_qaida/t/al–qaida–timeline–plots–
attacks/#.U–E5Bqx0y00. 




                                                 
concerns groupthink in the government.  However, over the past five decades, groupthink 
and its consequences have been studied in many types of organizational structures 
besides the government.  
Frequently, the homeland security enterprise displays the symptoms and 
consequences of groupthink in the poor quality of the decisions made by many of its 
leaders, the mismanagement of the organizations, the poor morale of the employees, and 
the ever fluctuating, ambiguous homeland security mission often characterized as a mile 
wide and an inch thick. The following research references discuss the phenomenon in 
government. Several investigate and analyze case studies of groupthink in government 
agencies, presidential administrations, and politics.  
Mark Schafer’s book, Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision-making in 
International Relations, asks if the decision-making process is responsible for the success 
of the plan. Specifically, Schafer analyzes foreign-policy cases studies across several 
presidential administrations.17 The author contends that many factors contribute to 
successful decision making, including decision-making techniques, leaders’ personalities, 
and group structures and dynamics. This book finds that “staffing of key offices,” the 
organization of decision-making groups, and the psychological composition of leaders 
determine the path of the decision-making process and decision-making agendas. 
Similarly, Robert Jervis’s book, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iraq War, details how the U.S. government spends massive amounts 
on gathering and analyzing intelligence, yet still, intelligence remains a flawed and 
imperfect process that has resulted in significant failures. The author undertakes two case 
studies—the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1978 under the Carter administration and the Bush 
administration’s claim that Iraq had a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in 
2002. In both cases, the author finds that the intelligence was deeply flawed, and worse, 
that the analysts were influenced and corrupted by political influence, poor decision 
making, the stovepiping of information between government agencies, as well as 
groupthink.  
17 Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink Versus High–Quality Decision Making in 
International Relations (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).  
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During the initial stages of the Iranian revolution, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) assured the White House that the Shah’s government was stable and secure. The 
CIA engaged in groupthink and convinced itself that the Shah’s government and its secret 
police were strong enough to allay the threat that the opposition posed. Moreover, the 
CIA and the intelligence community underestimated the religious and nationalistic 
commitment of the Iranian opposition, and it was not until very late in the revolution that 
the vulnerability of the American-backed Iranian imperial Shah government was actually 
perceived and reported to the president. In this case, the CIA did not engage in critical 
thinking in its analysis of the situation in Iran. According to this case study, the CIA did 
not actively engage in devil’s advocacy and did not seek outside expert’s opinions with 
which to compare and contrast its own analysis. Effectively, the CIA insulated itself from 
opposing opinions and dissent.18  
In his book, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy 
Failure, Paul Hart examines the groupthink phenomenon and how it influenced decision 
making in high-level government policy groups. This book looks in depth at the causes of 
policy failures, errors in decision making and groupthink theory, including hurried 
consensus by group members. The author claims that the get-along-to-go-along decision-
making process is a cause of major fiascoes in foreign policy, large projects, and strategic 
management in government. The author further reviews the original groupthink theory 
and introduces a new model for the phenomenon. He analyzes the case study of the 
Reagan administration’s Iran Contra affair, which the author believes was a serious bout 
of groupthink that resulted in a series of poor decisions.19 This book offers compelling 
and updated case studies of the symptoms and remedies of groupthink in the policy and 
decision-making process. 
18 Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).  
19 Paul Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure (Lisse, 
Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers, 1990).  
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3. Groupthink in Homeland Security 
In terms of the influence of groupthink on homeland security, it is necessary to 
understand how groups engage in groupthink when reacting to a disaster or in an 
operational setting. The book The Unthinkable: Who Survives when Disaster Strikes-and 
Why discuses “how human beings react to danger–and what makes the difference 
between life and death.” This book asserts that most Americans live and work in areas 
that have significant risks and many of those people will have to make hard decisions in 
the face of those threats. The author reviews case studies of disasters and how people 
have reacted in the face of those dangers, ranging from the explosion of the Mont Blanc 
munitions ship in 1917 and attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.20 
Similarly, the U.S. government reacted to the shock and horror of 9/11 by enacting 
unprecedented and arguably unnecessary (and certainly very expensive) security.21  
To be sure, not all researchers find groupthink at the bottom of every questionable 
government or homeland security policy or practice. For example, Daniel Scheeringa’s 
thesis, “Was the Decision to Invade Iraq and the Failure of Occupation Planning a Case 
of Groupthink?” uses Janis’s groupthink framework and subsequent groupthink research 
and found that groupthink was not the primary cause for the flawed decision making 
proceeding the invasion and occupation of Iraq.22 This paper provides alternative 
explanations for the questionable decision to invade and occupy Iraq, such as the Bush 
administration’s ideological agenda setting, which is, in itself, a cause of groupthink. 
Ideological agenda setting by a leader in a decision-making group can significantly affect 
the outcome and quality of the decisions being made. When a leader promotes his ideas 
instead of remaining neutral, thereby influencing the group, this lack of neutrality is a key 
factor of groupthink.  
20 Amanda Ripley, The Unthinkable: Who Survives when Disaster Strikes–and Why (New York, NY: 
Random House LLC, 2009).  
21 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
Security,” Homeland Security Affairs, 2011, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.1.16. 
22 Daniel Scheeringa, “Was the Decision to Invade Iraq and the Failure of Occupation Planning a Case 
of Groupthink?” (master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2012), http://scholar. 
lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-07292010-145020/unrestricted/Scheeringa_DJ_T-2010.pdf. 
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“Crimes of Obedience: ‘Groupthink’ at Abu Ghraib” questions the Bush 
administration’s statements that the torture at Abu Ghraib was an unauthorized action by 
rogue soldiers. The author argues that Abu Ghraib was a byproduct of the Bush 
administration that was embroiled in “group mind” or groupthink. This groupthink 
scenario dehumanized the enemy or the out-group. The in-group was willing to do 
anything necessary to win the “war on terror” including torture, to obtain intelligence. 
The soldiers at Abu Ghraib demonstrated severe symptoms of groupthink including an 
“us-versus them in-group” that believed in their own inherent morality and they clearly 
stereotyped and dehumanized the “out-group.” Both the administration and the solders 
collectively rationalized horrific acts and they hid behind their “illusion of 
invulnerability” and believed that they would not be held accountable for their actions.23  
This article eloquently describes the 9/11 era in which the modern homeland 
security enterprise was created. At this time, the public was gripped by a fear of terrorism 
and all purported enemies of the United States were lumped into the “axis of evil” or the 
“war on terror.” Homeland security was initiated by one of the greatest bouts of 
groupthink in American history in which the government was beleaguered by an “us-
versus them” outlook that believed in its own inherent morality and that it clearly 
stereotyped and dehumanized the out-groups identified as enemies. 
Some scholars have found that the homeland security enterprise’s decision and 
policy-making process is flawed and deeply affected by groupthink. Benjamin H. 
Friedman’s article, “Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security” in the Political 
Science Quarterly, discusses how Americans have demanded much more homeland 
security then they need or can afford. The irrational fear of terrorism has spurred billions 
of dollars in funding to prevent unlikely acts of terrorism. The threat of terrorism that has 
been allegedly mitigated by the nation’s enormous spending on “security theater” has 
been spurred on by politicians’ motivations and the government’s fear mongering to 
reinforce the fear of terrorism, and to further bolster the homeland security industrial 
23 Jerald M. Post and Lara K. Panis, “Crimes of Obedience: ‘Groupthink’ at Abu Ghraib,” 
International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 61, no. 1 (2011): 48–66, http://search.proquest. 
com/docview/848842810/DC5843EF5444445EPQ/1?accountid=12702. 
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complex. Friedman further discusses the fact that reformist policy makers who wish to 
expose this cycle of waste, fraud, and abuse should promote resilience to strengthen the 
nation’s population. Reformers should also introduce the population to a cost-benefit 
analysis that evaluates the risks, threats, and countermeasures to make the cost of 
homeland security more transparent.24 A cost-benefit analysis of homeland security 
would reveal that this spending was wasted, given the measurable threats that have been 
disrupted. The problem with a cost-benefit analysis of homeland security is that it is 
difficult to measure the deterrence aspect and how many attack plans have been 
abandoned or disrupted because of homeland security or the illusion of homeland 
security. 
4. Groupthink Remedies and Solutions 
The Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal article by Brandon 
Kennedy, “The Hijacking of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Groupthink and 
Presidential Power in the Post-9/11 World,” illustrates how leadership’s illusion of 
invulnerability, its dismissal of constructive criticism, and organizational groupthink, can 
minimize or dismiss opposing viewpoint, critical analysis, self-inspection, and 
constructive criticism in a decision-making process.25 Kennedy asserts that following 
9/11, the Bush administration mantra was that “freedom and justice will prevail.” This 
mantra became a theme for the administration’s homeland security and national security 
policies and nowhere was this sentiment more apparent than the administration’s policy 
regarding Iraq.  
This article recounts the September 15, 2001, meeting of the Bush national 
security team, including Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, and Powell. Wolfowitz 
believed the United States could fight both the Taliban and Iraq successfully and his 
misplaced illusion of invulnerability was embraced by the administration. President Bush 
24 Benjamin H. Friedman, “Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,” Political Science 
Quarterly 126, no. 1 (April 2011): 77–106, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/burn0277/pa5012/readings/Friedman 
%202011%20-%20Managing%20Fear.pdf. 
25 Brandon Kennedy, “The Hijacking of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Groupthink and Presidential 
Power in the Post–9/11 World,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal (Spring 2012), 633–
727, http://lawgip.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/21-3%20Kennedy.pdf. 
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believed that the United States would prevail because it was on the side of what was 
right. Bush believed that because America was just in its war on terror, victory for the 
United States was certain. Even after the war in Iraq began, no WMDs were found, and 
the United States appeared to be caught in a costly quagmire. The administration 
remained in a state of willful blindness characterized by excessive optimism sustained by 
an illusion of invulnerability and minimizing failures.26 
Kennedy asserts, in contrast, the Obama administration took steps to avoid 
groupthink. Kennedy further states that the Obama administration purposely chose 
persons for the Cabinet who came from different backgrounds to offer diverse 
perspectives. According to Kennedy, each member was assigned the task of critical 
evaluator for the decisions made by the team. With Iraq drawing down, the 
administration focused on Afghanistan. At the outset, President Obama said, “We have 
no good options here,” and he did not inject his personal views into the decision-making 
process. The president requested a range of options that the team would analyze and 
debate while he reportedly remained impartial. When it came time to make an executive 
decision, the president did not put forth his own preferences and he critically analyzed all 
the options.  
Even though the author describes how the administration took action to avoid this 
physiological phenomenon, it is debatable if it was enough to mitigate groupthink 
throughout the new Obama-led government. This article has merit but the author is 
politically biased toward the democratic Obama administration by recognizing its 
successes in coping with groupthink while omitting any of its failures. Conversely, this 
article omitted the Bush administration’s successes and focused on the groupthink in the 
Bush in-group.27 
One possible way to identify and overcome groupthink is through covert testing 
or “red teams.” Red teams offer unbiased observations and candid constructive criticism 
of the organization. Although, they are effective and important tools, the quality of red 
26 Kennedy, “The Hijacking of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Groupthink and Presidential Power 
in the Post–9/11 World,” 646–668. 
27 Ibid., 668–673. 
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team programs can also be disrupted by the groupthink phenomenon if, for example, the 
results are taken as a threat by the leadership (even if the same leadership called for the 
testing) or if mindguards apply pressure on red team operatives to manipulate or stylize 
their findings. As the University of Foreign Military and Cultural studies (UFMCS) notes 
in its Red Team Manual, an effective covert-security testing program requires support 
from the senior leadership of an organization. If senior leadership is susceptible to 
groupthink, the support for covert testing wanes and often test results are altered, 
influenced, or ignored. If organizational opposition or groupthink is too powerful to 
overcome, the red team program will fail and the vulnerabilities engendered or 
exacerbated by groupthink remain.28  
In the Role and Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities, the Defense Science 
Board finds that a successful red team program requires a forward-thinking 
organizational culture that rejects groupthink, values constructive criticism, provides 
support to the operatives, and acts on the team’s findings and recommendations.29 Scott 
Swanson’s article in the Small Wars Journal describes how obstructions to professional 
and effective red teams often reflect the program’s lack of organizational support or a 
culture willfully blind, does not embrace critical thinking, and is embroiled in the 
groupthink psychological phenomenon. Organizational obstructions can include 
groupthink bi-products, such as punishment of covert operatives by leadership, 
organizationally imposed constraints on the program, and an antagonistic reception of the 
team’s observations and recommendations. These obstructions often result in the 
organization hiding behind an illusion of invulnerability and ignoring identified 
vulnerabilities of the security infrastructure that leaves the target susceptible to attack.30  
28 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), Red Team Handbook (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, 2012), http://usacac.army. 
mil/cac2/UFMCS/. 
29 United States Defense Science Board (USDSB), Defense Science Board Task Force on the Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2003), http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/redteam.pdf. 
30 Scott Swanson, “Enhancing Red Team Performance: Driving Measurable Value and Quality 




                                                 
The phenomenon of devil’s advocacy is a key remedy outlined in Janis’s original 
groupthink theory. It has been studied and employed in the decision-making process to 
challenge the groups’ commonly held assumptions and to motivate critical thinking.31 
Chen, Lawson, Gordon, and McIntosh’s article, “Groupthink: Deciding with the Leader 
and the Devil,” investigates the impact directive leaders, participative leaders, and devil’s 
advocacy tactics have upon the decision-making group process. This study measures 
decision quality and groupthink symptoms. The study divided 92 men and 56 women into 
39 groups, “20 with 50 percent or more women, and 19 with 50 percent or more men.” 
The groups completed a decision-making process with either a directive or participative 
leader and some of the groups also had a devil’s advocate present. The study discovers 
that regardless of the gender composition of the groups, significantly lower quality 
decisions arise from groups with a directive rather than a participative leader.  
The study also determines that a devil’s advocate does not have a significant 
influence on the decision-making quality of the group. The study concludes that good 
leaders “encourage open inquiry to yield diverse alternatives for problem solutions.”32 
The finding on leadership concurs with Janis; however, its assertion that a devil’s 
advocate did not have a significant influence on the decision-making quality of a group is 
in conflict with Janis’s theory.  
Richard L. Epstein, in The Pocket Guide to Critical Thinking, instructs the reader 
in the art of reasoning in academia, as well as in everyday life.33 Critical thinking is 
necessary to enable innovation. Devil’s advocacy, red teaming, and the other remedies 
for groupthink, all encourage critical thinking. As this book asserts, the idea of critical 
thinking is the antithesis to groupthink and it is important to understand how to think 
critically to avoid groupthink and improve the decision-making process.  
31 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.  
32 Zenglo Chen et al., “Groupthink: Deciding with the Leader and the Devil,” The Psychological 
Record, 1996, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Groupthink%3a+deciding+with+the+leader+and+the+devil.-
a018911798. 
33 Richard L. Epstein, The Pocket Guide to Critical Thinking (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson 
Learning, 2000).  
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5. Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory is a theory of group dynamics and is closely related to 
groupthink because both study in-group and out-group relations, as well as the decision-
making process within groups. Social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner studied 
and documented social identity theory in the “The Significance of the Social Identity 
Concept for Social Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interactionism and 
Social Influence.” In this groundbreaking article, the authors theorize that individuals 
have the tendency to self-categorize into groups for the purpose of socially constructing 
their own identities closely reflecting the beliefs systems of the affiliated group. Group 
membership offers the individual an in-group in which to identify that often grants a 
perceived sense of belonging and a positive self-image. Although it is a commonly held 
belief that a person’s social identity is unique, social identity theory contends that it is 
developed and maintained by the interactive social-psychological process based upon 
social experiences, influences and groups unique to an individual’s life experience.34 
Henri Tajfel’s book, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, is a study of group 
dynamics. It analyzes conflicts within social groups, the role played by relationships 
within the groups, and the psychological processes responsible for the formation of 
groups. The author examines social psychology, social conflict, intergroup attitudes, and 
social reality.35 This book attempts to teach the student how to conduct lab, field, and 
case study research on social identity and influence. It also discusses research on social 
influence tactics, groupthink, dissonance theory, conformity, and resistance to 
influence.36  
Social identity theory is a concept closely related to groupthink. Both are studies 
of cognitive psychology that focus upon the individual and group identity, as well as the 
34 John C. Turner and Penelope J. Oakes, “The Significance of the Social Identity Concept for Social 
Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interactionism and Social Influence,” British Journal of 
Social Psychology 25, no. 3 (1986): 237–252, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2044-
8309.1986.tb00732.x/pdf. 
35 Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, vol. 7 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
36 Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress (Florence, 
KY: Psychology Press, 2007).  
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decision-making process and how it is influenced by the dynamics of the group. To 
comprehend groupthink, a person must understand the in-group and out-group dynamics 
established by social identity theory, which play a pivotal role in groupthink theory, as 
well as the study of homeland and national security issues. 
Social identity theory hypothesizes that people’s social identity plays a distinct 
role in their in-group behavior. Social identity theory also examines how groups and 
group members gain or lose status based upon the in-group and out-group dynamics, as 
well as the ability of the members to be socially mobile and moving from one group to 
another.37  
Social identity theory has had a far-reaching impact on the world of social 
psychology, including the study of terrorism and terrorist organizations. It is theorized 
that if counter-terrorism professionals understand the hermeneutic of a terror group, then 
they can better cope with that organization. It is often said one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter; attempting to ascertain what motivates a terror organization 
requires the identification of options that are not always obvious. An important concept in 
social identity theory is that individuals strive to achieve a positive self-image and 
attempt to identity their roles in their chosen in-group. These roles are defined by their 
social identities, and it is further theorized in social identity theory that individuals 
constantly strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity within this group.38 
Brannan and Strindberg have extensively researched social identity theory in 
respect to terrorism and radicalization. They have concluded that very few self-purported 
terrorism experts or academics have had contact with a person or group that they would 
identify as a terrorist. This begs the question of how can a person be an expert on an 
individual or group without ever having had the personal contact required to ascertain 
their hermeneutic. Brannan and Strindberg also contend that many terrorism researchers 
approach the research subjects in a predisposed hostile mode instead of with a clinical 
37 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations.  
38 Marlene E. Turner et al., “Threat, Cohesion, and Group Effectiveness: Testing a Social Identity 
Maintenance Perspective on Groupthink,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 5 
(November 1992): 781–796, http://www.csub.edu/~mdulcich/documents/group_effectiveness.pdf. 
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impartial research manner. Moreover, most researchers receive their information from 
western counter-terrorism agencies and organizations that vilify these groups and 
influence the researcher by sharing information that has been thoroughly biased.39  
A researcher who obtains information through a secondary source that has been 
influenced by another’s bias does not gain the opportunity to evaluate first-hand the 
hermeneutic of the group. Brannan and Strindberg have identified that many in the 
terrorism-studies community have engaged in groupthink by allowing themselves and 
their research to be influenced by biased information that depicts their research subjects 
purely as terrorists and without obtaining and documenting the research subject’s 
viewpoint. By not questioning the motivations and bias of their research sources and not 
seeking the alternative viewpoints, much of the terrorism-research community has acted 
as a mindguard for governments and counter-terrorism agencies. Instead of acting as 
devil’s advocates and unbiased researchers, they have perpetuated the accepted 
worldview that dehumanizes these groups and paints all of these as a threat and enemies 
of west. The alternative method that Brannan and Strindberg support is modeled on a 
social identity theory framework that includes a constructive and open dialogue with all 
sides of the research with the intent to understand the out-group’s hermeneutic. This 
approach may lead to a greater understanding of all parties that may result in a peaceful 
solution to the unending war on terror and attempts to denigrate the out-groups.40  
C. CONCLUSION 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis analyze Janis’s groupthink theory and historical 
case studies to develop and test the hypothesis that groupthink influences the homeland 
security enterprise to the detriment of national security. Studying historical groupthink 
case studies affords the researcher the opportunity to identify the causes, results, and 
outcomes of those incidents to draw parallels with groupthink episodes in the modern 
homeland security enterprise. This thesis also examines original case studies of decisions 
39 David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and NT Anders Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an 
Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 24, no. 1 (2001): 3–24.  
40 Ibid.  
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made by modern homeland security leadership in-groups to determine if any antecedent 
conditions and symptoms of groupthink are present and if the resulting failures and 
fiascos are caused by the groupthink psychological phenomenon or another deficiency. 
Furthermore, this thesis analyzes remedies established by Janis that have successfully 
alleviated instances of the groupthink phenomenon in the past to provide a mechanism 
that will help identify, manage, and mitigate this psychological phenomenon in the 
homeland security enterprise. 
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II. THE GROUPTHINK THEORY 
In his March 1952 Fortune magazine article, William H. Whyte, Jr. coined the 
phrase “groupthink” and he illustrated his groupthink theory with a cartoon image of a 
ship’s crew, all facing forward and saluting smartly, while the vessel sinks deeper under 
water. Whyte took issue with “rationalized conformity” in such complex organizations as 
atomic-age government, a condition that he saw as detrimental to the individual, 
innovation, and personal independence.41  
In 1972, psychologist Irving L. Janis produced the seminal work on this theory, 
Victims of Groupthink, which traced the phenomenon in foreign policy decisions and 
fiascos, as the volume’s subtitle put it.42 The problem arose when foreign-policymaking 
insiders, who prized their membership in this elite group more than the outcome of any 
particular decision, swallowed doubts or disagreements rather than disturbing the clubby 
air of prevailing wisdom. Janis continued to publish about the perils of going along to get 
along, perhaps because groupthink did not abate in the intervening years.43  
When groupthink occurs, it often distorts the decision-making process, which 
results in incorrect conclusions. Groups that engage in the phenomenon habitually reject 
outside influences and discourage creativity, critical thinking, and alternative viewpoints. 
Janis believed that “the more frequently a group displays the symptoms; the worse will be 
the quality of its decisions.”44 
Janis contended that groupthink is most likely to occur when a group is highly 
cohesive, comprised of individuals from similar backgrounds and is managed by a 
directive, dominant, or authoritarian leader.45 The group further descends into the 
groupthink trap if it does not consult with independent experts on the subject matter 
involved. It conducts limited research to prove or disprove its conclusions, and it 
41 William H. Whyte, “Groupthink (Fortune 1952),” Fortune Magazine, July 22, 2012.  
42 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.  
43 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 245–248. 
44 Ibid., 174–175. 
45 Ibid., 234–238. 
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discourages devil’s advocacy and critical thinking from within the group and from 
outside stakeholders. When a group is embroiled in the groupthink psychological 
phenomenon, its members are often pressured to conform and this stress influences 
members with low self-esteem to agree with the decision promoted by the forceful 
authoritarian group members or leader.46  
A. THE ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS OF GROUPTHINK 
Janis outlined antecedent conditions that may be present in an organization or a 
group that will result in an environment that may cultivate groupthink. Janis’s first 
antecedent conditions pertain to the structural faults of an in-group. These conditions 
include the homogeneity of group members’ social backgrounds and ideology, the degree 
of insulation of the group, a lack of impartial leadership, and a lack of norms requiring 
methodical procedures. Janis also describes further antecedent conditions, including high 
stress from external threats with little hope of a better solution than the leader’s chosen 
course of action, low group self-esteem temporarily induced by recent failures, and 
excessive difficulties on current decision-making moral dilemmas.47 
Janis refers to a condition found in groups with high cohesiveness, wherein 
inclusion in the in-group is more important to the members than the quality of the 
decisions produced by the group. These groups are often composed of members who 
have a similar background or perspective. Groups, such as military or law enforcement 
that traditionally comprise the members of the homeland security enterprise, possess a 
high degree of esprit de corps and cohesiveness because they are often from similar 
social backgrounds and they generally have similar belief and value systems.48  
To be sure, these attributes can be desirable in certain situations because they 
promote discipline but these highly cohesive groups also are more likely to suffer from 
the antecedent conditions of groupthink. However, cohesive groups do not always 
46 Turner et al., “Threat, Cohesion, and Group Effectiveness: Testing a Social Identity Maintenance 
Perspective on Groupthink,” 781–796.  
47 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 176–177. 
48 Ibid., 197–202. 
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succumb to groupthink; and can engage in critical thinking, devil’s advocacy, and dissent 
for the purpose of achieving a quality decision-making process. Therefore, group 
cohesion, or even the existence of an in-group is not, of itself, sufficient to cause 
groupthink.49  
Structural faults within organizations may distort the decision-making process. 
One such fault is the insulation of the group members and leadership from criticism, 
opposing viewpoints, and information provided by independent subject matter experts.50 
Another is the lack of impartial leadership in which the directive leaders uses their 
authority and position to influence the group to make decisions that mirror the leader’s 
preference.51 This type of leadership diminishes or discourages critical thinking and open 
inquiry within the group, who perceive it to be disloyalty, or a challenge to the in-group 
cohesion.52  
According to Janis, groupthink occurs when pressures lead to a deterioration of 
“mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.” Groups affected by groupthink 
ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational actions that dehumanize out-groups. A 
group is especially vulnerable to the groupthink phenomenon when no clear rules or 
methodical process for decision making exist because groups are expected to validate and 
not critically evaluate the leadership’s chosen course of action.53  
Janis further contended that environmental conditions are also a significant 
antecedent condition that can influence a cohesive in-group towards a groupthink 
environment. Highly stressful situations can create cohesiveness and influence a poor 
quality decision that the group members may have not made under different 
circumstances.54  
49 Paul ‘t Hart, “From Analysis to Reform in Policy–Making Groups,” Beyond Groupthink: Political 
Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy–Making, 1997, 247–278.  
50 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 176, 248–250. 
51 Ibid., 248–249. 
52 Ibid., 248–250. 
53 Ibid., 249–250. 
54 Ibid., 258–259. 
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Janis’s groupthink antecedent conditions feelings of inadequacy within these 
decision-making groups are often perpetuated by the belief that the organization’s 
leadership will not support the decisions if they differ from the leader’s own strategy.55 
Moreover, Janis asserts that decision-making groups influenced by groupthink are 
sometimes plagued by poor morale and low self-esteem due to past failures. Janis 
contends that in these situations, the members of the in-group search for acceptance and 
moral support from the leaders to heighten their collective self-esteem. Members of the 
group become motivated to please the leader, who in turn, provides them with positive 
validation of their decisions rather than critically analyzing the issue and making a 
difficult if not unpopular decision.56  
B. THE SYMPTOMS OF GROUPTHINK 
Janis documented eight symptoms of groupthink, many of which have plagued the 
homeland security policy and decision-making process.57  
• An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all the members, which 
creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks. 
• An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality, which inclines 
the members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their 
decisions.58 
• Collective efforts to rationalize to discount warnings or other information 
that might lead the members to reconsider their assumptions before they 
recommit themselves to their past policy decisions.  
• Stereotyped views of enemy leaders (out-groups) as too evil to warrant 
genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak and stupid to counter 
whatever risky attempts are made to defeat their purposes.59  
• Self-censorship of deviation from the apparent group consensus, which 
reflects each member’s inclination to minimize the importance of doubts 
and counterarguments.  
55 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 257–259, 301–302. 
56 Ibid., 301–302. 




                                                 
• A shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to the 
majority view (partly resulting from the self-censorship of deviations, 
augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent). 
• Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against 
any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, which makes 
clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal 
members.  
• The emergence of self-appointed “mindguards”—members who protect 
the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared 
complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.60 
Not all eight of these symptoms are necessary for groupthink; however, often 
when a group displays poor quality decision making, one or more of these symptoms 
have influenced the group and altered the decision-making process.61 
C. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES FOR GROUPTHINK 
Janis recommended specific measures to prevent groupthink in the decision-
making process. These measures stressed letting the group come to its own conclusions 
and not just promote the leader’s predetermined biased agenda. These remedies also 
stressed the importance of critical thinking and questioning the decisions made by the 
group along with the potential objectives of the opposition.62 
• The leader should assign the role of critical evaluator to each member to 
encourage the group to give high priority to airing objections and doubts. 
This practice must be reinforced by the leader’s acceptance of criticism of 
any judgments to discourage the members from soft-pedaling their 
disagreements.63  
• The leader in an organization’s hierarchy, when assigning a policy-
planning mission to a group, should be impartial instead of stating 
preferences and expectation at the outset. This practice requires each 
leader to limit his briefing to unbiased statements about the scope of the 
problem and the limitation of available resources, without advocating 
60 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 174–176, 194, 244, 256–
259. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 207–224.  
63 Ibid., 209–212. 
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specific proposals would like to see adopted. This practice allows the 
conference the opportunity to develop an atmosphere of open inquiry and 
to explore impartially a wide range of policy alternatives.64  
• The organization should routinely follow the administrative practice of 
setting up several independent policy planning and evaluation groups to 
work on the same policy question, with each executing its deliberations 
under a different leader.65 
• Throughout the period when the feasibility and effectiveness of policy 
alternatives are being surveyed, the policy-making group should from time 
to time divide into two or more subgroups to meet separately, under 
different chairmen, and then come together to hammer out their 
differences.66  
• Each member of the group should routinely discuss the group’s 
deliberations with a trusted associate and report back to the group on the 
associate’s reactions.67 
• One or more experts or qualified colleagues within the organization who 
are not core members of the policy-making group should be invited to 
each meeting on a staggered basis. The outside experts should be 
encouraged to challenge views of the members.68 
• At every meeting devoted to evaluating policy alternatives, at least one 
articulate and knowledgeable member should be assigned the role of 
devil’s advocate.69 
• Whenever the policy or issue involves relations with a rival nation or 
organizations, a sizable bloc of time should be spent surveying all warning 
signals from rivals and constructing alternative scenarios of the rival’s 
intentions.70  
• After reaching a preliminary consensus about what seems to be the best 
policy alternative, the policy making group should hold a “second chance” 
meeting at which every member is expected to express as vividly as 
64 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 209–212. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 212–214. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 214–219. 
70 Ibid. 
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possible, all residual doubts and to rethink the entire issue before making a 
definitive choice.71 
D. GROUPTHINK AND FIASCOS 
Janis frequently used the word “fiasco” in his work on groupthink theory and this 
word has become synonymous with groupthink. A fiasco is defined as a complete and 
utter failure.72 Janis admitted that groupthink is not the cause of all defective decision 
making and not all incidents of groupthink result in fiascos. Even defective decisions 
based on poor information and flawed judgment can have successful outcomes. Janis 
asserts in his case studies that even if lucky accidents occurred, groupthink may still 
exist. Janis suggests that the researcher ask the following key questions to determine if 
groupthink was the cause of the fiasco being examined.73 
• Who made the policy decisions? Was it essentially the leader alone or did 
group members participate to a significant degree? If the members 
participated, were they a cohesive group?  
• To what extent was the policy a result of defective decision-making 
procedures on the part of those who were responsible? 
• Can symptoms of groupthink be discerned in the group’s deliberations? 
(Do the prime symptoms pervade the planning discussions?) 
• Were the conditions that foster the groupthink syndrome present?  
If the answers for the previous questions are affirmative, then Janis proposed 
another question asking if any evidence can be detected that suggests new hypotheses 
concerning the conditions that promote groupthink.74  
E. JANIS’S HISTORIC CASE STUDIES OF GROUPTHINK  
Groupthink “fiascoes” documented by Janis in his work include the U.S. 
government failures to foresee the Empire of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
71 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 214–219. 
72 Oxford Dictionary, “Language Matters,” Oxford University Press, 2014, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com /us/definition/american_english/fiasco. 193–197, 203–204. 
.73 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 193–197, 203–204.  
74 Ibid., 194. 
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Kennedy Administration’s Bay of Pigs invasion, the Johnson Administration’s escalation 
of Vietnam war, and the Carter Administration’s doomed hostage rescue of the American 
Embassy personnel being held in Iran. While Janis details several cases of groupthink, 
the Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs are analogous to recent homeland and national 
security events. These two case studies were principal examples of fiascos in which 
groupthink was present and it influenced the quality of the decisions being made by the 
government in-group. Moreover, these failures altered the history of the nation.75  
1. The Pearl Harbor Groupthink Fiasco 
Janis’s case study discusses that political sentiment in the United States prior to 
Pearl Harbor, which believed the Empire of Japan did not possess the capability to attack 
the United States even though a clear pattern of aggression was present, as well as a 
series of evidence that the Empire of Japan was moving in that direction and an attack 
was imminent.76 
The United States and its government had been lulled into state of complacency 
and isolationism. The Naval Command in the Pacific’s decision-making process was 
based upon wishful thinking, an illusion of invulnerability, and rationalizing the warning 
signs that challenged the command in-group’s misconceptions. Military officers in the 
Pacific believed that Japan would never attempt an attack on Pearl Harbor because it was 
too well defended and the United States was too powerful. The military command in-
group believed Japan would only attack weaker targets, such as the Philippines or Guam, 
and they would never be foolish enough to attack the United States.77  
According to Janis, the Naval Command at Pearl Harbor attended a dinner party 
at Admiral Halsey’s home the evening of December 6, 1941. During this dinner, Mrs. 
Halsey expressed that she was certain that the Empire of Japan would attack Pearl Harbor 
in the near future. Captain Joel Bunkley recalled that everyone thought she was crazy 
75 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2–
136.  
76 Ibid., 75–76. 
77 David Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” Foreign Affairs, 1991, 145–146. 
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because the prevailing groupthink among the command staff was that the defense was too 
strong, they would have early warning of any attack, and as Captain J.B. Earl later stated, 
“we always felt that ‘it couldn’t happen here’….”78  
Admiral Kimmel and his in-group were not completely to blame for missing the 
warning signs. Washington DC Naval Command also considered the probability for 
attack on Pearl Harbor extremely remote.79 The Washington, DC, Naval Command’s 
misconceptions were based on the same reasons as the Pearl Harbor command staff. 
Members of the President’s War Council did not all share this optimistic view believing 
that an attack by Japan on U.S. interests in the Pacific was going to occur in the very near 
future. The wording of messages sent by the Washington DC Naval Command to the 
Naval forces in the Pacific were soft-peddled, which conveyed that the situation may not 
be as dire as predicted by certain members of the President’s War Council.80 
Admiral Stark, who was part of the Washington DC Naval Command and a close 
friend of Admiral Kimmel, acted as a mindguard and reinforced the illusion of 
invulnerability of the Pearl Harbor command in-group. Neither the Navy nor the War 
Counsel actually sent a clear alert to Pearl Harbor. Both these groups’ messages were 
unclear and subdued to remain politically safe. A clear warning of the threat that Japan 
posed may have prompted the Pearl Harbor Command to act and it could have prevented 
the resulting historic catastrophe.81 
Janis contends that this illusion of invulnerability of Kimmel’s in-group command 
staff was not shared by the entire Pearl Harbor naval community. Officers not in 
Kimmel’s in-group were deeply concerned about an impending attack. Many prepared 
their ships defenses against an attack, and on December 7th, these were prepared for the 
attack far better than the ships commanded by Kimmel’s in-group. Even though 
dissenting opinions were expressed within the officer ranks at Pearl Harbor, Admiral 
78 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 76. 
79 Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” 138–152.  
80 Steven M. Gillon, Pearl Harbor: FDR Leads the Nation into War (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
2011), accessed October 26, 2014, ProQuest ebrary.  
81 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
80–83. 
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Kimmel had isolated himself within his command staff in-group that laughingly 
dismissed the out-groups dire predictions.82  
Despite warnings in late November and early December that negotiations had 
broken down and war with the Empire of Japan was expected, Admiral Kimmel did not 
increase reconnaissance flights or defenses, and still believed in Pearl Harbor’s illusion of 
invulnerability. The entire Pearl Harbor command staff in-group agreed that Hawaii 
would not be the target but instead Guam would be where the Japanese would strike. The 
sector north of Hawaii was left unsecured, and it was not monitored by reconnaissance 
flights. The Japanese descended on Hawaii from the north.83 The Japanese Command 
had the contingency plan that if they were knowingly observed by U.S. reconnaissance 
prior to December 7, they would have aborted the attack. Other overt warning signs that 
the Empire of Japan was planning to attack the United States included the Japanese 
consulates being ordered to destroy secret codes in U.S. and British territories.84  
Janis asserts that Admiral Kimmel’s surrounded himself with a cohesive in-group 
of advisors whom he conferred with daily and he regularly socialized with this group. 
They were like-minded men who were unquestionably loyal to their commander. Even 
when Kimmel doubted his own viewpoint on December 6, 1941, feeling that he may have 
erred and an attack somewhere in the pacific was imminent, this in-group acted as 
mindguards and assured him that Japan could not launch an effective attack against Pearl 
Harbor because Japan was too heavily engaged in other conflicts in Asia. Even after this 
catastrophic failure and fiasco, Kimmel’s supporters rallied around him for years and 
defended his actions and decisions,85 based upon their poor advice and the failure caused 
by their groupthink.86  
82 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
93–95. 
83 Frederic L Borch, III, “Guilty As Charged?” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 13, 
no. 2 (Winter 2001): 54, http://search.proquest.com/docview/223679585?accountid=12702. 
84 Ibid., 78–91. 
85 Associated Press, “Family of Pearl Harbor Admiral Blamed in Attack Wants His Exoneration,” 
Evansville Courier, April 28, 1995. 
86 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
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2. The Bay of Pigs Groupthink Failure 
Janis considered the Bay of Pigs Invasion as one of the worst groupthink disasters 
in history that was perpetrated by an otherwise responsible government and highly 
educated and intelligent people who were members of the Kennedy in-group. The refusal 
of the exceptionally cohesive in-group to question President Kennedy’s plan was in part 
due to the unquestioned loyalty and admiration that many of the in-group had for the new 
president. A belief existed among the in-group members that questioning the plan would 
foster doubt and disloyalty to the burgeoning administration. The group members 
believed that for the political good of the administration, and undoubtedly themselves, 
devil’s advocacy and critical thinking in relation to the President’s invasion plan would 
show disloyalty to the president. Kennedy’s own personal charisma played a role that 
made members of the in-group who were otherwise critical thinkers, docile and 
unquestioning of the plan that he was supporting.87  
This plan included the invasion of communist Cuba by 1,400 Cuban expatriates 
living in the United States who were being trained and supported by the CIA and the U.S. 
military. On April 17, 1961, the invasion commenced but the Cubans army was not taken 
unaware. A force of 20,000 Cuban solders met the invasion force and the invasion’s 
reinforcing provisions were not delivered. Within three days, the survivors were captured 
and sent to prison camps. The United States attempted to deny involvement but the 
administration and the nation was humiliated by this poor plan and the resulting defeat. 
This invasion resulted in Castro forming an alliance with the Soviet Union, placing 
Soviet military assets 90 miles off the coast of the United States, and setting the stage for 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.88  
In this case study, Janis emphasizes that this groupthink disaster was undeniably 
the fault of President Kennedy and his in-group of advisors. This in-group consisted of 
highly qualified, educated, and experienced individuals who had the capability to analyze 
plans critically and offer well-designed alternative courses of action. Each member of 
87 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
14–49. 
88 Howard Jones, Bay of Pigs (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2008), 95–130. 
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Kennedy’s in-group was selected for their decision-making and critical thinking abilities 
yet they failed do so with the Bay of Pigs plan, and thus, submitted to groupthink. Janis 
asserted in this case study that the groupthink milieu was fueled by the excitement of 
their recent presidential victory, the celebrity status of President Kennedy, an illusion of 
invulnerability, illusions of unanimity, and the suppression of doubt among the in-
group.89 
Furthermore, the in-group made serious miscalculations, based on assumptions 
fueled by the administration’s belief in its inherent morality and invulnerability. The in-
group believed that the CIA would be able to secrete the fact that the United States was 
supporting the invasion.90 The in-group also believed that the Cuban military and Air 
Force were ineffective, incompetent, and weak, and that they could be swiftly neutralized 
and overwhelmed by the American supported invasion force and in-country Cuban 
resistance. These assumptions were wholly inaccurate and the Cuban military swiftly and 
decisively defeated the U.S. supported exile forces.91  
In his work, Janis discusses how groupthink led this talented group to make such 
poor decisions. He cites that that administration did not want to show political weakness. 
It also wanted to give the impression that it was leading the anti-communist efforts. The 
president’s new cabinet was elated by the political victory but the members were not yet 
at the point where they felt comfortable with each other or speaking in a frank manner. 
As a result, objections and concerns regarding the President’s plan were soft peddled and 
quickly dismissed by the in-group. The members of the in-group also did not want to 
been seen as disloyal to the president so they held back personal misgivings. Moreover, 
they allowed themselves to be overwhelmed by the CIA and the military officials who 
were left over from the Eisenhower administration and who supported the invasion. The 
need for secrecy was believed to be so great that the in-group of decision makers was 
89 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
14–49. 
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very small and all documents were collected after meetings, which made it difficult to 
analyze the plan effectively.92  
These factors all lead to a groupthink catastrophe in which members of the in-
group to maintain their cohesiveness and individual status within the group developed a 
shared illusion of invulnerability and unanimity. The high level of certainty within this 
group gave the members the mistaken belief that what they were doing was inherently 
correct and moral. Critical thinking and analysis was suppressed by the members of the 
in-group acting as mindguards to defend against any devil’s advocacy from within or 
from outside the small circle. The in-group members adopted a get-along-to-go-along 
attitude and they did not want to been labeled as disloyal or dissenters in the new clubby 
administration in-group.93  
3. The Cuban Missile Crisis Groupthink Counterpoint 
Janis conducted case studies of counterpoints in which the in-groups exercised 
critical thinking and creativity in their decision-making process, and thereby, mitigated 
groupthink, which created well-organized and successful conclusions. One of Janis’s 
groupthink counterpoints was the Kennedy Administration’s management of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, when the world stood on the brink of nuclear war. Kennedy’s in-group 
was still reeling from its failure in the Bay of Pigs invasion when it embraced critical 
thinking and devil’s advocacy to bring a peaceful and successful conclusion to a brewing 
disaster that could have ended in a nuclear catastrophe.94  
President John F. Kennedy and his in-group of advisors were capable of admitting 
their mistakes and learning how not to repeat them. Kennedy recognized his own failures 
and the fact that he desired so fervently to eliminate the communist threat in Cuba that he 
directly involved himself and his personal bias in the decision-making process. He also 
92 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
31–35. 
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understood that he improperly influenced his in-group of advisors95 to agree to his plan, 
which consequently, neutralized their independence, critical evaluation, and alternative 
plans.96  
The Cuban Missile Crisis proved to be the Kennedy administration’s finest hour 
and an interesting example of an antithesis to groupthink. In the year following the Bay 
of Pigs, Cuba allowed the Soviet Union to install missile installations seemingly armed 
with nuclear missiles and defended by an estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers. The 
administration realized that it had an immediate threat just off shore the American 
homeland and if the missiles were fired, they could eradicate up to 80 million American 
citizens with minimal warning. Russia claimed that these missiles were only capable of 
augmenting the Cuban air defense system and much of the Washington political 
establishment and the intelligence community believed this claim to be true.97 On 
October 16, 1962, an American U2 plane captured photographs of a ballistic missile site 
that could only be used for offensive purposes.98  
Janis detailed that President Kennedy quickly summoned his advisory in-group 
that was later called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, and it 
was comprised of members of the administration’s in-group, many of whom were 
involved in the Bay of Pigs. Janis further contended that President Kennedy removed 
himself from the decision-making process to avoid influencing the group with his 
preferred course of action as he had done in the previous failure.99 
On the first day, Kennedy explained to the group that submission to Cuba or the 
Soviet Union was not an option nor was a diplomatic solution utilizing the United 
95 Sheldon Stern, Stanford Nuclear Age: Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths Versus 
Reality (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 18–21, accessed October 26, 2014, ProQuest 
ebrary.  
96 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
138–140. 
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31. 
98 Amy B. Zegart, “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure,” Policy Review, no. 175 
(October/November 2012): 23–39.  
99 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
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Nations. Kennedy pressed that his main concern was that under no circumstances could 
the Russian missiles remain in Cuba. The Kennedy in-group of decision makers, not 
wanting to fall prey to the same set of circumstances that lead to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, 
did several things differently than they had in the previous crisis. Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy was designated as the group’s devil’s advocate. In this role, he ardently 
examined and attempted to discredit the in-group’s various decisions. His purpose was to 
promote discussion and debate as to the quality and the merits of the plan, as well as to 
anticipate disadvantages, opposition, and alternate courses of action. The in-group 
studied a wide range of alternative plans and courses of action, and carefully examined 
the positive and negative aspects of the various plans. They also examined dissenting 
opinions and expert opinions, especially those that recommended a different course of 
action from that currently being taken by the in-group. They developed contingency plans 
for the various courses of action in case the original plan failed and alternative plans 
needed to be employed.100  
As a result, a highly probable nuclear showdown was avoided and based upon the 
sound decision making; Kennedy was able to dissuade the Russian Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev from the path of war.101 Both Kennedy and Khrushchev made great 
advances in the relationship between the two countries by humanizing the opposition and 
breaking the stereotypes that both countries had of their opponent. The Kennedy in-group 
used the lessons learned from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They employed critical thinking and 
self-evaluation to guide the world back from the brink of nuclear war.102  
F. CONCLUSION 
Homeland security leaders must appreciate Janis’s original case studies to learn 
from the mistakes made by the leaders in the past. Groupthink can cause the complete 
and utter failure of a plan or decision as demonstrated by these notable case studies. 
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Kennedy learned that if a leader surrounds himself with an intelligent, competent in-
group, the leader should not influence the group with his own bias. High-quality leaders 
who wish to encourage their groups to come to quality decisions should support 
independent thought and devil’s advocacy. They must persuade group members to speak 
their minds and offer alternative courses of action without fear of reprisal. Unfortunately, 
modern homeland security leaders often quell devil’s advocacy and manipulate and 
micromanage the decision-making process to promote personal or political agendas to the 
detriment of both the homeland and national security of the United States.103  
103 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
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III. GROUPTHINK IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
Before September 11, 2001, U.S. political and national security communities 
suffered the very same groupthink symptoms as the Pearl Harbor Naval command prior 
to December 7, 1941. Political sentiment believed that the homeland was beyond the 
reach of foreign terrorism even though a clear pattern of escalation of attacks on U.S. 
interests both in foreign theaters and domestically was apparent. In the 1990s, al Qaeda 
was building its network and it was growing bolder with each successive attack. A 
progression of attacks in the early and mid-1990s led to the 1998 U.S. Embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania followed by the bolder attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 
2000.104 The litany of escalating attacks targeting U.S. interests in foreign theaters 
clearly demonstrated a pattern of evidence that foreign terrorist groups were growing 
bolder and more sophisticated with each attack and they intended to continue the jihad.105 
Nevertheless, both the Clinton and Bush administrations appear to have been willfully 
blind to the escalating pattern of terrorism and this denial of reality trickled down and 
spread throughout society.106 
Just as some of Kimmel’s officers who were not in his immediate in-group 
foresaw the attack on Pearl Harbor, some in the counter-terrorism community identified 
the pattern of attacks leading up to 9/11.107 However, in both cases, the invasive 
atmosphere of groupthink was overwhelming and stifled these out-group opinions. The 
dissenters were silenced by the political in-group’s mindguards that chose to perpetuate 
the U.S.’s illusion of invulnerability and engage in wishful thinking in hopes that the 
impending attack on the homeland would never materialize. Both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations dismissed the experts who warned that the escalating pattern of attacks 
might be a prelude to a catastrophic attack on U.S. interests. The prevailing political in-
104 Windrem, “Al–Qaida Timeline: Plots and Attacks.”  
105 Kean, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
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group’s groupthink, focused on an illusion of invulnerability, and mistakenly believed 
that the U.S. homeland would never be target of foreign terrorism. This wishful thinking 
was encouraged by advisors and other officials serving both presidents who formed an in-
group that acted as mindguards, and shielded the presidents from reality and the 
increasing danger.108  
The Bay of Pigs fiasco also draws parallels to what has occurred in the homeland 
security enterprise in the past two decades. In the years following the attack on 
September 11, 2001, the U.S. homeland security enterprise was driven not by political 
excitement from a recent election victory, as in the Bay of Pigs, but rather by the need to 
respond to this catastrophic attack perpetrated on the United States and the American 
people.109 Following 9/11, the political establishment’s in-group suffered from a 
particularly powerful case of groupthink. At that time, the U.S. government believed in 
its own inherent morality and it suffered from an illusion of invulnerability. It also 
believed that the power and authority granted to the government by the American people 
to counter the threat of terrorism was unquestionable and unlimited.110 The Bush 
administration’s slogan was that “freedom and justice will prevail,” and this motto 
became a theme for its homeland security policies.111  
A. GROUPTHINK IN THE FOUNDATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
The modern homeland security enterprise was the result of that attack on 
September 11, 2001. On that day, the U.S. government was awakened from the long 
period of groupthink, which assumed that terrorism was a foreign problem and would 
never affect the homeland. The national security enterprise employed a borders-out 
108 Eichenwald, “The Deafness Before the Storm,” 71–197. 
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policy that had not changed significantly since the beginning of the Cold War.112 The 
existing national security and homeland security collective consciousness clung to an 
“illusion of invulnerability,”113 if not willful blindness.114 It discounted the string of 
terrorist incidents that occurred in the homeland before the attacks of 9/11, and thereby, 
miscalculated the threat that al Qaeda posed.115 September 11 presented the U.S. 
government with the reality of the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to acts of terrorism. 
Fear gripped the nation, seriously affecting the federal government, travel, trade, 
economic systems, and the psyche of the American people.116  
The original mission of post-September 11 homeland security was to streamline 
and organize the U.S. domestic counter-terrorism efforts.117 The government was 
propelled into a seemly worldwide war on terrorism. Leftover Clinton-era and brand new 
Bush administration officials were tasked with developing the framework for the 
homeland security strategy of the nation. Just as with the Kennedy Bay of Pigs in-group, 
they were a highly experienced and intelligent in-group of people but from the beginning, 
the authority and priorities of the homeland security enterprise seemed confused, 
disjointed, and politically motivated.118  
During Secretary Ridge’s swearing in ceremony, President Bush stated, “The best 
defense against terror is a global offensive against terror.” He also stated, “I’ve given 
Tom and the Office of Homeland Security a mission: to design a comprehensive 
coordinated national security strategy to fight terrorism here at home.” However, to fight 
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terrorism at home, an important piece of the puzzle was left out of the new Office of 
Homeland Security. The actual authority and jurisdiction to investigate terrorism 
domestically remained firmly in the Department of Justice (DOJ) and with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).119 The architects of the Department of Homeland Security 
considered this flaw in the homeland security framework, and yet, it was not corrected, 
and the authority to investigate acts of terrorism in the homeland was left out of the new 
department’s legal jurisdiction,120 which rendered it ineffective as a counter-terrorism 
agency.121  
Instead of focusing on the counter-terrorism mission, Secretary Ridge decided to 
form a border agency, and combined Customs, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Coast Guard, and the Agriculture Food Inspections Program into a single 
federal agency but he was met with staunch political opposition to this change. The 
agencies and political rivals mired in decades of bureaucracy and groupthink refused to 
entertain the consolidation recommended by the 9/11 Commission. Ridge’s only ally was 
Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, who is widely remembered as the early Bush 
administration’s critical thinker.122 
In 2002, Whitehouse Chief of Staff Andy Card, and long time in-group Bush 
colleague, was given the authority to put together a working group to develop the newly 
proposed DHS. Card picked political allies and confidants who were not experts in 
homeland security subject matter.123 Rather, the new members of Card’s in-group could 
be trusted not to challenge him but rather to advance his agenda. This in-group was 
extremely secretive, and Card was considered the driving force behind the creation of the 
new department and the corresponding homeland security enterprise. Card’s in-group 
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acted as mindguards that fended off opposition or criticism of his plans. President Bush 
backed Card’s plan, and on June 6, 2002, he announced in a press conference a 
permanent Cabinet level DHS.124  
The DHS came to fruition in March 2003. Despite what administration planners 
had promised, it was far from the streamlined counter-terrorism organization that had 
been envisioned to prevent the stove piping of intelligence and protect the domestic 
security of the United States. The new DHS was composed of 22 separate legacy 
agencies, each with its own culture and continually vying for political dominance and 
funding.125 Each culture was managed by its own agency leadership mired in its own 
environment of groupthink. Since then, the DHS has evolved into a lumbering behemoth 
that has been littered with political appointees and others in senior leadership with little to 
no expertise in homeland security and whose main objectives involve the perpetuation of 
the agenda of whatever administration placed them in power.  
Secretary Ridge’s goal, and the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation calling for 
the smooth coordination of the agencies and missions within the new department, was an 
impossible task because of the competing agendas of the various actors who had 
surrounded themselves with in-groups and who each formed their own political kingdom. 
Each in-group was dominated by its own particular groupthink.126  
Although a change has occurred in presidential administrations and multiple 
shufflings of and among the department’s senior leadership, the DHS and the 
corresponding homeland security community, still remain a fractured, loose 
confederation of agencies and components that constantly struggle for mission relevance, 
funding, and dominance. Each in-group is mired in its own brand of groupthink aimed at 
furthering its own biased agenda. Each in-group collective rationalizes about its own 
invulnerability, morality, and unanimity while censoring itself through the use of 
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mindguards and pressure on dissenters. Creativity and critical thinking are discouraged in 
the DHS, particularly if it goes against the prevailing ever-shifting groupthink of the 
current dominant in-group.  
B. GROUPTHINK IN THE DHS 
The DHS has had a succession of senior leaders, continuously coming and 
going.127 Qualified homeland security leaders either do not accept management positions 
within the DHS or they quickly depart the agency when they comprehend how difficult 
and arduous is their position.128 Many senior leaders view the DHS positions as a 
temporary avenue to a highly paid position in the private sector and they leave the agency 
as soon as they secure one of these positions.129 The absence of competent, committed, 
and consistent leadership has lead to an organizational environment in which even simple 
governmental tasks have become arduous and the very mission of the DHS has become 
obscured and difficult to define. Each successive leadership in-group arrives with a 
preconceived agenda and often a thorough redefinition of the respective homeland 
security agency mission. Often these new agendas are to the detriment of established and 
crucial legacy homeland security agency missions.130  
1. The Revolving Door at the DHS  
Organizational instability, poor quality leadership, and ambiguous missions have 
created a toxic working environment in many segments of the DHS that has led to a large 
number of career employees fleeing the agency. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) is continuously loosing employees at all levels. Kenneth Kasprisin, 
a former TSA leader stated, “You cannot sustain a high level of security operations when 
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you have that kind of turnover.’’ He attributed the losses to a toxic culture and terrible 
morale.131 According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) FedScope 
database for the period of 2010 and 2013, 31 percent of permanent employees departed 
the DHS, compared to 17 percent in the overall federal government.132 FedScope also 
revealed that in 2013, the departure of DHS Senior Executive Service (SES) employees 
was up 56 percent from 2012, while the SES departures for the overall federal workforce 
remained constant and unchanged.133 
This unstable leadership cadre continuously refocuses homeland security on new 
missions, and often excludes career personnel subject matter experts from the decision-
making and leadership process.134 The continuous stream of new DHS leadership 
incarnations perpetuate their own groupthink bias, and habitually bring in their own 
management teams composed of their former colleagues, and thus, further isolate 
themselves. Frequently, the new leaders and their management in-groups share similar 
backgrounds, work histories, and life experiences, which therefore, fulfils an antecedent 
condition of groupthink.135 Members of these in-groups act as mindguards, who interdict 
constructive criticism, innovative ideas, and alternate outside viewpoints that further 
isolate the senior leadership while promoting their biased agenda at the expense of the 
established homeland security missions.136 Additionally, these cohesive in-groups 
dehumanize and discredit individuals or groups within the organization that have 
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alternative perspectives.137 Employees who do not engage in the current cycle of 
groupthink are often punished, isolated, or deposed by the leadership in-groups.138 
2. “Brownie, You’re Doing a Heckuva Job” 
A well-known homeland security management failure occurred in late August and 
early September 2005, when Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast.139 The failure 
of the DHS to respond properly to Hurricane Katrina resulted in criticism of homeland 
security leadership, which focused on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
Director Michael Brown, who was a member of the republican administration’s 
homogeneous in-group. Following Hurricane Katrina, President George Bush visited the 
Gulf Coast, and during a press conference, he made the infamous statement, “Brownie, 
you’re doing a heckuva job,” about Michael Brown’s leadership of the federal response. 
Although Brown had performed adequately in past disaster response, DHS Secretary 
Chertoff believed that Brown had frozen under the pressure during Katrina, and he had 
become a subordinate and not a leader.140  
President Bush was so isolated by his in-group and blinded by an environment of 
groupthink he did not recognize that the federal homeland security response with which 
Brown was charged was woefully slow to respond to devastated areas or that many 
response assets were waiting for days after the storm to be activated by the DHS. The 
administration’s illusion of invulnerability, collective rationalization of the group’s 
efforts or morality, and its shared illusion of unanimity thoroughly clouded the judgment 
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of the administration’s decision-making in-group with respect to Brown’s leadership and 
the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the federal response.141  
Following the Hurricane Katrina fiasco, the Bush administration mitigated 
groupthink by supporting the 2006 White House report that reviewed the federal 
Hurricane Katrina response.142 This report recognized that, “Ultimately, when a 
catastrophic incident occurs, regardless of whether the catastrophe has been a warned or 
is a surprise event, the Federal government should not rely on the traditional layered 
approach and instead should proactively provide, or ‘push,’ its capabilities and assistance 
directly to those in need.”143 It further discussed both the mistakes and successes of the 
response, including how federal capabilities were overwhelmed and the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the federal government’s actions. It recognized that many of the 
failures were similar to those identified during the response to Hurricane Andrew in 
1992.144 
This report was endorsed by the Bush administration and the Bush in-group 
demonstrated that in this instance, it recognized failures had occurred and it took 
responsibility. The fact that the Bush administration supported and endorsed this report 
shows that in this instance, it did attempt to counter groupthink using Janis’s established 
remedies by assigning a critical evaluator to review and analyze the management of the 
Hurricane Katrina response. The writers of this report played the role of devil’s 
advocates, and exposed the defective decision-making process and poor leadership during 
the Hurricane Katrina disaster.145  
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3. The Reformation of the Federal Air Marshals Service  
Nowhere has groupthink and the resulting poor decision-making process by senior 
homeland security officials been more perceptible then in the Federal Air Marshal 
Service (FAMS). Before 9/11, the FAMS was a small elite group of highly trained 
undercover agents who were primarily deployed on international flights based on 
intelligence and threat information to counter air-piracy and terrorism. Following 9/11, as 
part of homeland security, the FAMS was aggressively promoted and grew exponentially, 
and hired thousands of new federal air marshals (FAMs). To manage this new agency and 
large influx of employees, the DHS retained a group of former retired United States 
Secret Service (USSS) managers for most of the senior leadership positions.146 The 
homogeneity of this new in-group composed almost exclusively from the USSS fulfilled 
one of Janis’s primary antecedent conditions, that of all members of the in-group have 
similar backgrounds, form a highly cohesiveness in-group, and inclusion in the in-group 
is more important to the members than the quality of the decisions produced by the 
group.147  
In late 2001, former USSS Director John Magaw was appointed by the 
administration to help create the new TSA. Magaw retained the services of his former 
USSS colleagues, including Thomas Quinn as the Director of the Federal Air Marshal 
Service who replaced the pre-9/11 career Federal Air Marshal Director. This former 
USSS in-group hired Robert Byers another former USSS colleague as the Deputy 
Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service.148 This in-group of senior leaders replaced 
the original cadre of career pre-9/11 FAMs in most senior leadership roles almost 
exclusively with retired USSS officials, and thus, firmly cemented their elite, cohesive in-
146 Robert J. MacLean and Anonymous Federal Air Marshal, “Air Marshals and the Secret Service 
Factor,” Scribd.com, January 26, 2006, http://www.scribd.com/doc/122150590/Air–Marshals–and–The–
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group. No pre-9/11 FAM was appointed to a senior leadership position while more than 
80 retired and former USSS officials swelled the ranks of the FAM senior leadership.149  
Career FAMs who were program area experts were alienated from the leadership 
in-group. This perception of “hostile take-over” of the FAMS by the former USSS 
created an environment of “toxic” morale within the agency. Career agents therefore felt 
that they were under constant and unfair scrutiny by the leadership.150 In a survey 
conducted by the DHS, Office of Inspector General, 52 percent of career employees 
polled believed that FAM senior leaders would never be held accountable for their 
actions even if they were engaged in serious misconduct.151 During the years following 
the post-9/11 reformation of the FAMS, USSS managers continued to swell the senior 
ranks and the leadership became further alienated from the career employees.  
The culture and mission space of the FAMS and that of the USSS is vastly 
different. Yet, the former USSS senior leaders instituted many of the same policies from 
their legacy agency, even when these policies were woefully out of date or inappropriate 
for the FAMS’s mission. The FAM leadership in-group did display several symptoms of 
groupthink in their management and in decision-making processes concerning the new 
agency. Evidence points to the fact that the groupthink environment generated by the core 
leadership in-group inspired many controversial decisions made by this group. The 
leaders understood the USSS protection mission but they did not adapt these techniques 
to address the new unique mission of the FAMS. Rather, they transplanted them intact to 
the FAMS. Many career FAMs believed that these managers did not understand the 
unique mission of the FAMS and the leadership in-group perpetuated this belief by 
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ardently supporting and enforcing policies even when they were inappropriate or 
dangerous.152  
Director Quinn and his in-group had instituted a strict formal dress code requiring 
all FAMs on mission status to dress in business attire, including a jacket and tie. The 
Washington Post reported that in one instance, Director Quinn visited Reagan National 
Airport on Thanksgiving 2004 to “thank” the FAMs for taking time away from their 
families on the holiday to secure the homeland. According to the article, he was shocked 
to see his Marshals dressed in a casual manner during his visit.153  
A Washington Times article alleged that this incident led the FAMS’ leadership to 
ensure that all FAMs on mission status were adhering to the strict formal dress code or 
face removal from mission status, be administratively charged, and consequently, face 
possible suspension or termination. The article further states, “A memo from the Chicago 
office says men must wear a business suit with a collared dress shirt, tie and dress shoes. 
Female marshals must wear business suits with a blouse, knit top or dress shirt and dress 
shoes.”154.  Also, “Anyone found not to be in compliance with this policy will be placed 
in a leave status. Moreover, all dress violations will be considered misconduct and 
followed up with quick and firm disciplinary action.”155 
Viewing this episode through Janis’s established groupthink framework, it 
appears that Director Quinn had been thoroughly isolated by his in-group of advisors. 
Quinn’s in-group were acting as mindguards, and shielded him from the reality of what 
was occurring in the field and the enormous amount of opposition to the strict dress code 
and other policies.156 The dress code standard was motivated by an outdated USSS dress 
code policy. It was based on the fact that the USSS often conducts its mission in a formal 
setting that requires formal business attire. Similarly, FAMs assigned to flights filled with 
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travelers dressed in formal business attire dressed accordingly. However, the mandate 
called for business dress for FAMs on all missions, even when it was wholly 
inappropriate, such as when they were assigned to a flight filled with tourists headed to 
warm vacation locations.157 This requirement was unrealistic and it was not sensible in 
most cases. Consequently, the public began to identify FAMs on flights based upon how 
they were dressed, which compromised their undercover status and safety. It also made 
the job more difficult for the FAMs, who were required to work long and rigorous 
mission schedules and maintain the formal business attire while on constant travel 
status.158  
To the credit of FAM senior leadership, in 2006, the dress code was relaxed in 
response to objections from the law enforcement officers associations on behalf of the 
rank and file FAMs;159 the Association of Flight Attendants that stated that FAMs “look 
like FBI or Secret Service agents straight out of central casting” and the Allied Pilots 
Association, which also said that changes are needed to protect the FAM’s identities. The 
dress code was replaced with more casual dress attire consistent with the mission.160 
The problems at the FAMS have continued. Career FAMs also have alleged that 
the former USSS leadership reportedly belittled them, because the leadership believed 
that they were not qualified for a federal law enforcement position and characterized 
them as amateurs. The leadership’s alleged stereotyping of the career FAM out-group has 
significantly degraded the morale of the rank-and-file FAMs.161 Senior leadership also 
requires the career FAMS to work a long and arduous schedule, to the point at which 
many were filing complaints that their quality of life was being significantly affected by 
their demanding mission travel schedules. In contrast, senior leaders work a set schedule 
in an office setting and are not held to the same standards in respect to training and 
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mission schedules.162 The career FAM employees’ ideas, criticisms, and objections have 
been routinely dismissed by the leadership and those who did voice objections to the 
agency leadership’s decisions were allegedly aggressively targeted for retribution by 
mindguards who applied direct pressure on dissenters. As a result of the history of 
retribution and retaliation, most complaints against the FAM leadership are conducted in 
an anonymous manner because the authors greatly fear reprisal by the leadership in-
group.163  
4. The United States Secret Service 
More recently, the USSS has been involved in several high profile scandals. The 
investigations into some of these failures are still occurring and all the facts of the 
failures in leadership have yet to surface. While it is too early to conduct a thorough 
groupthink case study, it can be discerned that Secret Service leadership is suffering from 
certain antecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink. To be sure, groupthink is not 
the only cause of all of the Service’s problems but it does appear to play a role.  
One high-profile incident of the USSS leadership engaging in some of the 
conditions and symptoms of groupthink stands out in particular. On November 11, 2011, 
a man fired a rifle from his vehicle, so that bullets struck the White House. USSS 
leadership on site told the responding agents and officers to stand down, falsely believing 
that the sound of the gunshots were that of a vehicle backfiring.164 When agents and 
officers protested and expressed that they believed these were actual gunshots, they were 
silenced by agency leadership, in effect acting as mindguards by refusing to entertain 
alternative perspectives. Some of the shots struck the White House just a few feet away 
from where officers were posted on the roof but leadership still dismissed their reports. 
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Officers and agents did not challenge leadership165 in this case because they were 
intimidated and did not want to be labeled as disloyal or dissenters, and feared reprisal.166  
The USSS is an agency with a proud history. Over the past decade, the USSS has 
been asked to do more with far less,167and the number of agents and officers has shrunk 
dramatically, while the number of protectees has increased.168 Funding for basic physical 
security has been cut and countermeasures, such as the placement of gunshot locators, 
have not been implemented.169 The security deficiencies are in part due to the service’s 
shrinking budget and in part to an illusion of invulnerability on the part of the leadership, 
which believes that the image of the service and security theater are enough to counter 
threats.  
As with many senior executives in the DHS, some of the Service’s leadership has 
submitted to a get-along-to-go-along groupthink posture. Senior leaders throughout the 
DHS have been accused of putting the agency mission second to appeasing their political 
benefactors. Furthermore, just as in every other component of the DHS, the USSS 
hierarchy has become a temporary stopover for much of this agency’s senior leadership. 
DHS and USSS leaders have been criticized for being more focused on networking for 
their lucrative retirement careers than fighting for resources for the agency and preserving 
the extremely important homeland security mission.170 
5. The Vocabulary of Groupthink  
Under the Bush administration, homeland security officials continually publicized 
the war on terror and the Axis of Evil to perpetuate the fight against what the political in-
group perceived as a global jihad targeting the west. This environment of groupthink 
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erroneously categorized all enemies of the United States as a single entity, even when 
these adversaries had no affiliation with one another and vastly different philosophies. 
One such incident occurred in 2005 when the Boston Herald reported that the El 
Salvadorian international criminal organization Mara Salvatrucha (MS)-13 was in league 
with al Qaeda, and was smuggling Islamic fundamentalist terrorists over the southwest 
border into the United States. This story was attributed to “intelligence officials” in 
Washington, who warned law enforcement agencies that al Qaeda terrorists have been 
spotted with members of MS-13 in El Salvador.171  
Both these organizations did pose a legitimate threat to the United States, but one 
was a criminal organization whose purpose is to make money through illegal enterprises, 
while the other was a global jihadist organization bent on expelling the west from the 
Islamic world and establishing a global caliphate. These were two vastly different 
organizations with entirely dissimilar objectives and no common ties. Entwining both of 
these groups into one vast threat demonstrates an interesting illustration of the groupthink 
environment that occurred during this time period. The press, alleged intelligence 
officials, and the political in-group were coping with the stress of the aftermath of 
September 11 and the then-burgeoning war on terror. In this case, they collectively 
rationalized that all enemies of the United States were combined into the one overarching 
menace bent on the destruction of the nation, however dissimilar and unlikely this 
alliance may have been.  
Despite the new Obama’s administration,172 the homeland security groupthink 
environment did not abate. The groupthink was refocused and redefined to reflect the 
new administration’s agendas, which was shifting from a conservative-based platform to 
a liberal or progressive-based ideology. In 2009, in one of the more bizarre groupthink 
episodes, the administration engaged in its own Orwellian brand of groupthink when the 
new Secretary of Homeland Security used the term “man-caused disasters to replace 
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in the Post–9/11 World.”  
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“terrorism” as part of the new administration’s “move away from the politics of fear 
toward a policy of being prepared for all risks that can occur.”173  
“Man-caused disasters” became part of the sanctioned homeland security 
vocabulary as part of the new administration’s progressive-based groupthink ideology 
that attempted to make the war on terror more tolerable to its political base. This verbal 
retooling was a haphazardly designed response to the overuse of the Bush 
administration’s axiomatic war on terror phrase.174 Despite the attempt to force through 
the change in terminology, “man-caused disasters” never caught on in the homeland 
security lexicon because of the absurdity of this inelegant attempt to make the war on 
terror more politically correct and aligned with a more palatable and progressive agenda.  
C. GROUPTHINK IN THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE 
Groupthink in homeland security does not appear to be a problem only within the 
DHS. This psychological phenomenon is discernible throughout the homeland security 
enterprise, which is becoming a covenant issue that both sides of the political aisle can 
publically denounce. However, historically, when the parties demanding reform gain the 
political power necessary to make change, very little genuine reform actually occurs, 
which reinforces the dysfunctional homeland security status quo. 
1. The Operation Fast and Furious Fiasco 
Operation Fast and Furious is a significant homeland security enterprise 
groupthink fiasco that occurred under the purview of the Obama administration, the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (BATF) and DOJ. This doomed 
operation allowed gun traffickers to smuggle approximately 2,000 firearms across the 
173 Cordula Meyer, “Interview with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano: ‘Away from the 
Politics of Fear,’” Spiegel Online, March 16, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-
with-homeland-security-secretary-janet-napolitano-away-from-the-politics-of-fear-a-613330.html. 




                                                 
U.S. Mexican border and into the interior of Mexico.175 U.S. officials believed that they 
could track these smugglers and the weapons leading them to drug cartels and possibly 
significant arrests. This operation was undertaken to prove that the United States was 
serious about stopping firearms trafficking across the border.176 
Unfortunately, this plan was ill conceived and the weapons were not effectively 
tracked once they entered Mexico. These weapons have been used repeatedly in cartel 
violence and narco-terrorism including the murders of numerous Mexican citizens and 
law enforcement officers, among them U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.177 This ill-
fated operation also damaged U.S.-Mexican diplomatic relations because of the obvious 
fact that the U.S. government knowingly allowed dangerous high-powered weapons to be 
smuggled into Mexico and obtained by the murderous drug cartels that pose a significant 
threat to the Mexican people and government.178 
Operation Fast and Furious has resulted in Congressional investigations, 
continuous media coverage, and a serious damage to the image and credibility of the U.S. 
and the Obama administration. The planning of this operation shows numerous 
groupthink antecedent conditions and symptoms, including the insulation and 
homogeneity of the operation’s decision-making in-group, which was comprised of like-
minded senior leaders from the DOJ and BATF.179  
A BATF whistleblower stated that the BATF and DOJ leaders knew that the 
weapons were going to be used in crimes of violence in Mexico yet they allowed these 
weapons to be given to dangerous drug cartels that wreak havoc on both sides of the 
border. One investigative report of this fiasco states that Justice Department Official Joe 
175 Louis Fisher, “The Law: Obama’s Executive Privilege and Holder’s Contempt:” Operation Fast 
and Furious,”“ Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2013): 167–185, http://www.loufisher.org/docs/ 
ep/fast2.pdf. 
176 Patrik Jonsson, “How Mexican Killers Got U.S. Guns from ‘Fast and Furious’ Operation,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, July 26, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0726/How-Mexican-killers-got-US-
guns-from-Fast-and-Furious-operation. 
177 Fisher, “The Law: Obama’s Executive Privilege and Holder’s Contempt:” Operation Fast and 
Furious,”“ 168. 
178 Ibid., 169–170. 
179 Ibid., 167–185 
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Cooley said that the smuggling of approximately 2,000 firearms into Mexico was “an 
acceptable practice.” This last statement thoroughly dehumanizes and devalues the lives 
of the people, who were likely to become victims of the violence perpetrated by the drug 
cartels using the weapons provided by the U.S. government.180 
Furthermore, according to witnesses and whistleblowers from inside the 
organizations, the BATF and DOJ were deeply ensconced in an environment of 
groupthink because they did not adequately survey the possible negative consequences of 
this operation and apparently lacked sufficient contingency planning that would have 
enabled them to track the weapons beyond the border. The “groupthink” environment 
willfully blinded the U.S. officials. They appeared not to consider how they were 
violating their own agencies’ primary mission of preventing the illegal trafficking of 
firearms, which they instead facilitated. Witnesses also stated that BATF employees who 
voiced criticism of the decision-making in-groups operational plans were set upon by 
agency mindguards, met with resentment and ostracized, while their ideas were ignored 
or discredited.181  
2. Counterpoint: Appointment of a Rival to Counter the ISIS and 
Groupthink Threat 
During 2013 and 2014, the most significant threat since 9/11 emerged. The 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has spread across the Middle East and it is now 
considered the world’s richest and most powerful terrorist organization. It can be debated 
whether ISIS is a terrorist organization or a fledgling Islamic nation state, which has 
carved itself a large swath of territory out of pieces of Syria and Iraq. Whatever ISIS may 
be, it does pose a legitimate threat to the United States.182  
Political pundits have focused on the public disagreements strategy between 
President Obama and some of his military leaders over the nation’s ISIS strategy. 
180 Fisher, “The Law: Obama’s Executive Privilege and Holder’s Contempt:” Operation Fast and 
Furious,”“ 167–185. 
181 Jonsson, “How Mexican Killers Got U.S. Guns from ‘Fast and Furious’ Operation.” 
182 “ISIS a Threat Worse than al Qaeda,” September 16, 2014, http://aclj.org/radical–islam/isis–a–
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However, the selection of former United States Marine General John Allen, a well-known 
critic of the president’s policies, as the leader of U.S. counter-ISIS effort typifies one of 
Janis’s established remedies for avoiding groupthink.183 General Allen is a 35-year 
veteran of the United States Marine Corps and has had a long and distinguished career, 
including command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International 
Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, from July 2011 to February 
2013.184  
General Allen is also considered a neo-conservative and many of his military 
views are vastly different from those of President Obama.185 To the contrary of the 
administration’s ISIS strategy, Allen has publically called for a vigorous U.S. war against 
ISIS. The president’s political opposition may criticize him for the differences in 
opinions that the administration has with many of its top military officials but the 
president should be credited for identifying and appointing a political rival, whom is also 
a subject matter expert, to lead the U.S. effort in this emerging conflict. If allowed to do 
so, General Allen can play the vital role of devil’s advocate in challenging the 
administration in-group’s commonly held assumptions and possibly exposing flaws in the 
current ISIS strategy. The introduction of a political opponent and subject matter expert 
into the ISIS strategy-making in-group is in accordance with Janis’s original groupthink 
remedies. This change promotes critical thinking and it offers alternative perspectives to 
the president. The administration can effectively minimize the groupthink physiological 
phenomenon in the nation’s ISIS strategy, if it continues to follow this course of 
action.186  
183 Eli Lake and Josh Rogan, “Can Obama Keep His Generals in Check in the War Against ISIS?,” 
The Daily Beast, September 17, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/17/are–obama–and–
his–generals–on–the–same–war–plan.html.  
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allenj?view=bio. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
It has been over a decade since the post-9/11 restructuring of the homeland 
security enterprise, yet many of its alleged troubles remain and the groupthink milieu of 
the political leadership in-group has not abated. The groupthink environment permeates 
throughout the DHS, and correspondingly affects the homeland security enterprise. While 
groupthink is not the cause of every problem in homeland security, in a great many 
instances, it appears to have negative influence. The environment of groupthink in 
homeland security is discernible by examining the poor quality of the decisions made by 
many of its leadership in-groups, the mismanagement of the organizations, the poor 
morale of the employees,187 and the confused ever-fluctuating and ambiguous homeland 
security mission. 
187 Josh Hicks, “Homeland Security Ranks Lowest Amid Declining Job Satisfaction Among Feds,” 
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IV. HOMELAND SECURITY GROUPTHINK CASE STUDIES 
Groupthink does not occur exclusively in executive-level strategic homeland 
security senior leadership planning and decision-making groups. This psychological 
phenomenon has influenced operational planning and decision making throughout the 
homeland security enterprise. The distinction between strategic and operational failures is 
that in the homeland security sphere, operational failures are often studied and 
reexamined in after-action reports that develop best practices and lessons learned. 
Conversely, strategic failures of executive level senior leadership policy and decision-
making in-groups are frequently overlooked because senior leaders do not often analyze 
and publicize their own failures. Moreover, homeland security strategic planning and 
decision-making failures are not as spectacular as operational fiascos and they do not 
draw as much media attention or political scrutiny as do homeland security operational 
failures.  
Groupthink has affected the outcome of several homeland security operations, and 
turned them into significant failures that have had or nearly had disastrous consequences. 
This chapter includes case studies of homeland security episodes that were affected by 
groupthink. The homeland security enterprise’s management of the assault on and the 
resulting siege of the Branch Davidians compound in Waco, Texas188 and the manhunt 
for the Boston Marathon bombers in Watertown, Massachusetts,189 were both influenced 
and hindered by the groupthink phenomenon. In the Branch Davidians case, groupthink 
led to a disaster and major loss of life.190 In the Boston Marathon bombing manhunt, 
disaster was for the most part avoided, but significant failures and mistakes were made in 
the response and management of this incident.  
188 Dick J. Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1998). 
189 James Hooley et al., “Boston Strong Is No Accident,” Watermark, Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, Five, no. One (Spring 2014). 
190 James D. Tabor, Why Waco? Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America (Oakland, 
CA: University of California Pr, 1997). 
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The Brown standoff191 that occurred in 2006 is offered as a case study and a 
counterpoint to homeland security groupthink. It involved Edward and Elaine Brown, 
who were influential leaders in the Constitutional Rangers militia movement. The 
Browns were tried and convicted of violations of the federal income tax code but prior to 
their conviction, they secluded themselves on their property in rural Plainfield, New 
Hampshire. The Browns publically challenged the government to assault their fortified 
residence; however, the U.S. Marshals Service used critical thinking, creativity, and the 
lessons learned from past operational fiascos to apprehend the Browns successfully and 
without a long-standing siege or bloodshed.192  
A. WACO: A HOMELAND SECURITY GROUPTHINK FIASCO  
Former Black Panther and political activist Eldridge Cleaver referred to the 
tragedy at the Branch Davidians Waco complex as President Clinton’s Bay of Pigs.193 
The events that occurred in Waco, Texas in 1993 and lead to the deaths of four BATF 
special agents and 74 Branch Davidians predated the popular use of the term “homeland 
security.” Nevertheless, this event marked a watershed moment in the modern U.S. 
homeland security enterprise and was the convergence of conflicting social, political, and 
religious insular groups. This incident also had a direct correlation to major homeland 
security incidents over the past two decades including the U.S. militia movement and the 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.194 The lessons learned by 
communicating with these radicalized communities and analyzing these types of 
incidents through the groupthink theory framework are useful in future interactions with 
extremists and radicalized communities.195 
191 “Tax Fugitive Barricaded in House: ‘Show Us the Law, and We’ll Pay,’” January 28, 2007, 
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The failure of the U.S. federal authorities to study, analyze, and understand the 
Branch Davidians caused catastrophic results.196 The tactics used during this incident 
were the result of the government in-group having a poorly designed plan and the refusal 
by this in-group to deviate from the pre-established course of action as they barreled 
headlong into disaster, on not just one but two occasions during this terrible episode.197  
1. The Branch Davidians: An Unlikely Terrorist Group  
The Branch Davidians cannot be neatly classified as a terrorist organization198 but 
that is what they became in the perception of the public and how they were addressed by 
law enforcement. As Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg state, “One such error has been a 
tendency for Western politicians and writers to adopt an antagonistic and condescending 
view of terrorists—one that precludes a full understanding of their motives and goals. To 
deal effectively with the problem of terrorism, it is essential to attempt to understand the 
terrorists’ actions from their perspective.”199 While popular public perception might 
classify the Branch Davidians as a domestic right-wing extremist group, they were an 
unlikely terrorist organization composed of a congregation of people from various races, 
nationalities, backgrounds, and ideologies.200  
The Branch Davidians trace their origins back to William Miller, the forefather of 
the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Miller and his followers were fascinated with the 
Christian Bible’s Book of Revelations and the prophesized “End Time,” when Jesus 
Christ will return and lead 144,000 true believers to salvation. When the dates of the 
Second Coming that Miller predicted came and went; he stepped down from public life 
and his group fractured. One of these groups became the Seventh-day Adventist church. 
In 1935, Victor Houteff challenged the church’s in-group doctrine proclaiming that while 
the true believers would be saved, a “great crowd” from outside the Church also would be 
196 Tabor, Why Waco? Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America, 105–106. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid., 33–38. 
199 Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an Independent Analytic 
Framework for the Study of Violent Sub–state Activism,” 3–24. 
200 Tabor, Why Waco? Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America, 23–26. 
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granted salvation.201 The Adventist leaders responded to Houteff’s challenge by 
expelling him from the church, as they found his teachings to be sacrilegious and 
disruptive.202  
Houteff and his flock moved to Waco, Texas, where they became an out-group in 
the church. They named their group the Davidian Seventh Day Adventists. Houteff 
believed that the End Time was near, and prophesied that he was the Lamb sent to open, 
interpret, and execute the prophecies of the Book of Revelations. He sent his message to 
the international Adventist community by publishing religious literature and sending his 
disciples to preach the word and recruit followers.203 Houteff issued a challenge to the 
patron church by proclaiming that his beliefs were in direct opposition to the in-group’s 
doctrine. Through his efforts, Houteff hoped to break to the patron church’s cycle of 
groupthink and its grip on the Adventist community to encourage the social mobility of 
converts from the in-group patron church to his out-group.204  
In 1955, Houteff passed away and his wife Florence took control of the faction, 
and relocate to Mount Carmel in Waco, Texas. She established her leadership over the 
groupmind of the Branch Davidians by making a public proclamation that her husband 
would be resurrected to lead them to Israel to await the End Time.205 Florence Houteff’s 
public proclamation publically failed when Houteff did not arrive as predicted. One of 
Houteff’s disciples, Benjamin Roden, saw an opportunity to seize control of the group 
and he made his own proclamation that he was the true sign from God, a prophet to lead 
the Davidian Seventh Day Adventists to salvation. Roden challenged Florence Houteff  
by declaring that he was the anointed “Branch,” a “Davidic” figure who was to lead the 
true believers to prepare for the End Time. Roden quoted Jesus, stating, “I am the vine, 
and you are the branches;” thereafter, the group became the Branch Davidians.206  
201 Anders Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism” (Working Paper, July 
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As with many groups with powerful, autocratic leaders, the Branch Davidians 
became embroiled in groupthink. Whether this development was the design of the 
leadership or a product of the community’s isolation, the Branch Davidians developed a 
dichotomous us-versus-them world-view. The community espoused a theology that the 
End Time would occur within a generation and they were preparing for this cataclysm.207 
Each successive leader was a strong, controlling personality who would influence the in-
group dynamic and the path of the community. When a leader passed away or was 
deposed, conflict ensued within the in-group, but always a dominating figure would 
emerge. The community members would conform to the new leader’s in-groups beliefs, 
or they would be expelled. The core in-group was inclined to support each successive 
leader teachings that were continually based upon the original vision of Victor Houteff.  
2. The Seventh Angel 
David Koresh was born Vernon Wayne Howell on August 17, 1959. He was an 
aimless young man without a formed cultural or social identity who came from a broken 
home.208 Koresh embraced religion and lectured his friends on the Bible, but he was 
confused about what path to follow in life. He was a member of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church, and like Houteff, he believed that the church had become corrupt, and 
had also strayed from its origins. Ultimately, he was expelled for his radical theories. He 
became a member of the church out-group, but this expulsion only strengthened his 
convictions about the corruption of the parent church. Koresh arrived at the Mount 
Carmel complex in 1981. Soon, Lois Roden took the 22-year-old Koresh under her wing 
both as her successor and her lover,209 and made him part of the Branch Davidian in-
group.210  
207 Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” 542–544. 
208 Ibid., 545. 
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This development provided him a cultural and social identity, sense of direction, 
and the stable familial unit211 that he never had in his previously unguided life. Koresh 
was too strong a personality to be overwhelmed by the community’s groupthink 
environment. Instead, he manipulated that environment; in 1983, Koresh became Roden’s 
official successor.212  
Koresh issued a challenge213 to the other Branch Davidian would-be leaders when 
he legitimized his claim of leadership by proclaiming214 that he was Houteff’s direct 
successor and the “seventh angel” god’s chosen prophet.215 Koresh’s bold proclamation 
that he was the prophet did not wholly influence every member of the community. Others 
waiting for Lois Roden to advocate the leadership of the organization were not 
subjugated by Koresh, and the atmosphere of groupthink he was establishing. While 
Koresh was on a pilgrimage to Israel, Roden’s son George216 seized control of the group 
through intimidation and threats217 to Koresh and his followers, who were expelled by 
force from the Mount Carmel property in 1985.  
In 1987, Koresh and his followers responded to George Roden’s challenge218 by 
attacking the Mount Carmel complex. Koresh and his followers were tried for attempted 
murder but the judge declared a mistrial. Later, Roden was arrested and incarcerated for 
an unrelated murder and Koresh returned to Mount Carmel as the Branch Davidians’ 
undisputed leader.219 Koresh engaged in social creativity to solidify his leadership and 
the groupthink environment further by again proclaiming that he was the Seventh Angel 
of the Book of Revelation, the last prophet, and he possessed the spirit of Jesus Christ 
211 Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” 542. 
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embedding himself in the spiritual mythology of the group.220 The groupthink for the 
Koresh in-group was so pervasive that he began to preach that he had to take many wives 
to spread his holy seed while the other male members of his flock—even those who were 
married—had to remain celibate.221 Koresh had at least five wives and multiple sex 
partners who were married to members of the organization. The cultural identity of the 
in-group that encouraged collectivism222 was so powerful that Rachel, his first wife, and 
the members of his flock, accepted this behavior as God’s will.  
Koresh gained complete control of the group by eliminating his rivals. He needed 
a new adversary that the group could focus on, and thereby, reinforced its social identity 
and reaffirmed the group’s us-versus-them world view. Koresh proclaimed that the U.S. 
government was the modern incantation of Babylon, and the forces of Babylon would 
assail the Branch Davidians during the End Time. Koresh proclaimed that he would be 
martyred; “The Lamb” would be slain in the battle but he and the faithful would rule in 
the Kingdom of Heaven with God.223  
3. The BATF’s Operation Showtime 
At the time of the raid, approximately 130 Branch Davidians made their home in 
Mount Carmel. Many were women and children. Other than undercover BATF Agents, 
federal officials never approached the Branch Davidians prior to the raid. BATF Special 
Agents stormed the compound to serve a warrant issued regarding suspected illegal 
weapons. The Branch Davidians were licensed gun dealers who traveled the gun show 
circuit, with the proceeds from sales going to the support of the community.224 Before the 
raid, the Branch Davidians had attempted to contact the BATF through their business 
partner who was a local gun store owner but their offer to communicate was ignored by 
220 Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism,” 6–7. 
221 Tabor, Why Waco? Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America, 41. 
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agents. Koresh was attempting social change when he tried to meet with the BATF. He 
presented the BATF with a positive motivated opportunity, which the BATF refused.225  
On February 28, 1993, a convoy of 80 vehicles and two military Blackhawk 
helicopters carrying BATF Special Agents descended on Mount Carmel. The BATF 
requested support from the Texas National Guard counterdrug program based upon 
allegations of suspected drug related manufacturing and activity in the compound.226 
During this operation, the BATF and then the FBI used the military for logistical, 
support, and medical purposes.227 Military assets also provided equipment and aircraft 
during the siege and assault. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), Joint 
Task Force Six provided the BATF range practice and other training at Fort Hood, 
Texas.228  
The use of the military during this operation was a matter of debate and 
controversy in the government and within the militia community. The GAO’s report 
(GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133) found that the support that the military provided the BATF 
and the FBI was authorized under section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 1991 (P.L.101-510) and under 32 U.S.C. § 112. The support during the ensuing 
siege required no connection to drugs but the military expenses had to be reimbursed.229  
Branch Davidian supporters and the American militia movement view the military 
support as a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act and an attempt of the U.S. government 
to use the military to disarm the citizenry. In the militia communities hermeneutic, the 
use of military support, equipment, and training by federal law enforcement agencies 
classifies them as an army rather than a conventional police force. According to John 
Grady of the Militia News, “Jack-booted, helmeted, armor-vested ‘law enforcement’ 
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S.W.A.T. teams now conduct KGB-type raids by kicking down doors in the middle of the 
night.”230 It is widely believed that the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building by 
Timothy McVeigh was retaliation against the BATF office at this location from which 
the raid on Waco was planned and launched. Also, the bombing occurred on April 19, 
1995, two years following the final Waco assault and the death of the Branch 
Davidians.231  
On the morning of the raid, the news media had been circling the area all morning 
because the BATF Public Information Agent tipped them off regarding the impending 
raid. The presence of the media, in turn, had alerted the Branch Davidians, specifically 
when a KWTX reporter asked for directions from a U.S. postal carrier who happened to 
be David Koresh’s brother-in-law.  
When “Operation Showtime,” as the BATF had named it, swung into high gear 
and the raid team approached the complex David Koresh, or so he claimed, shouted out 
the front door “Get back, we have women and children in here let’s talk!” It is unclear 
which side actually fired first; but either way, gunfire erupted and a major battle 
ensued.232 Four BATF special agents were killed and 16 were wounded. Six Branch 
Davidians were killed and many were wounded. The Branch Davidians called 911, 
asking for the raid to cease. By noon, most of the fighting was over and the infamous 51-
day standoff began.233 
4. The BATF and Groupthink 
In the planning and operational phases of this event, the BATF leadership 
suffered from several of Janis’s groupthink symptoms. In the face of exposure, failure, 
and certain bloodshed, the BATF leadership refused to abandon or alter its plan. This 
plan was so ill conceived, and it did not consider any of the Branch Davidians’ End Time 
230 John Grady, U.S. Government Initiates Open Warfare Against American People, Militia News, 
Collector’s Edition 1994, at 2, reprinted in STERN, supra note 14, app. 104. 
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theology. Prior to the raid, the BATF leadership was engaged in its environment of 
groupthink because it was entirely intent on initiating a spectacular raid to prove its value 
as a federal law enforcement agency. The lack of any type of contingency plans and the 
in-group’s refusal to deviate from the ill-fated operation makes this raid one of the worst 
groupthink incidents in modern American homeland security.234  
One of the most pronounced groupthink symptoms was that BATF leaders acted 
as mindguards, and discounted warning signs and failed to consider alternative strategies, 
such as aborting the raid or establishing communications with Koresh to offer him the 
chance to surrender peacefully. The operational leadership did not deviate from its 
doomed course of action even when BATF Special Agent Robert Rodriguez, who was 
undercover in the Mount Carmel complex, reported to BATF leaders on the morning of 
the raid that Koresh had told him that he knew the raid was imminent.235  
According to BATF Special Agent Ken King, no alternative plan for peacefully 
serving the warrant was developed. The BATF was facing congressional hearings and 
massive budget cuts, and a possible consolidation into the FBI.236 The BATF was intent 
on raiding the Mount Carmel Complex to create dramatic dynamic entry video footage to 
impress legislators.237 The BATF decision-making in-group displayed several of the 
symptoms of groupthink, including the fact that the entire operation was based upon an 
illusion of invulnerability, in which the in-group did not recognize the serious faults in its 
plan.  
5. We’re the FBI and We’re Here to Help 
Within 24 hours of the initial assault, the FBI took over as the lead agency at the 
scene and the situation degraded into a standoff and siege of the Mount Carmel complex. 
234 Terence M. Garrett, “The Waco, Texas, ATF Raid and Challenger Launch Decision Management, 
Judgment, and the Knowledge Analytic,” The American Review of Public Administration 31, no. 1 (2001): 
73–77, http://arp.sagepub.com/content/31/1/66.full.pdf+html. 
235 Ibid., 73–74.  
236 Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation, 32. 
237 Clive Doyle, A Journey to Waco: Autobiography of a Branch Davidian (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2012), 1–2. 
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The FBI has primary jurisdiction in investigating the murder of federal officials, and due 
to the deaths of the BATF agents, the FBI was the primary federal agency on at the 
Mount Carmel scene.238  
The federal agents again did not recognize that they were confronting a devout 
fundamentalist Christian group that had a distrust and fear of the government. The 
Branch Davidians’ own groupthink beliefs told them that the forces of Babylon were at 
their gates ready to destroy them and only by god’s word would they surrender.239 The 
siege legitimized and reinforced the group’s us-versus-them social identity, which 
entrenched them deeper in the righteousness of their cause.240  
The government made little effort to understand the Branch Davidians or their 
theology. Often, when a law enforcement officer is murdered in the line of duty, a 
revenge groupthink mindset clouds the judgment of otherwise intelligent, well-meaning 
law enforcement professionals. The government’s groupthink assumed that agents were 
faced with violent, well-armed religious extremists who had murdered multiple law 
enforcement officers. The officials believed in the inherent morality of their mission and 
not that the BATF may have been at least in partly to blame for this chaotic situation. The 
federal hostage negotiators would mentally shutoff Koresh when he began to preach his 
philosophies and they made little attempt to understand or put themselves in the place of 
the Branch Davidians.241 If the officials had listened to Koresh and consulted outside 
expert theologians familiar with the Branch Davidians, instead of stereotyping them as 
unstable radicals, they may have been able to negotiate a peaceful conclusion to the 
siege.242  
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The FBI did consult metal health experts to give them a personality profile of 
Koresh. They supplied the doctors with information from anti-cult activist and 
disenchanted former members on which to base their assessment. In doing so, the FBI 
again acted as mindguards, and manipulated the assessments to further bolster and 
rationalize their own preconceived beliefs. The assessment stated that Koresh was a 
narcissistic, lying manipulative psychopath and rational methods would not work. The 
FBI based its strategy on this erroneous assessment.243  
On March 12, FBI officials further aggravated the situation when they began a 
campaign of psychologically aggressive tactics. They cut off electricity to the compound 
and they began to play loud music, religious chants, audio of family members, and 
sounds of animals being slaughtered. Lights illuminated the windows and helicopters 
hovered over the compound.244 The government rationalized these questionable tactics 
because it believed that it was inherently moral and righteous. The government in-group 
dehumanized the Branch Davidians and further alienated them by re-enforcing the 
Davidians us-versus-them social identity.245 
On April 14, Koresh proclaimed that he had received word from God to begin his 
interpretation of the Book of Revelation and the Seven Seals, whereupon he would 
surrender to the authorities. On April 18, he finished the interpretation of the First of the 
Seals. The Branch Davidians were joyful and Koresh thought he would soon be able to 
enlighten the world with his religious vision.246 Again, the government in-group refused 
to entertain this possibility for a peaceful conclusion—even though it was positive—and 
Koresh’s promise that he would surrender after he finished his interpretations was 
ignored.247 No alternatives or deviation to the government in-group’s plan was 
considered. Koresh had to surrender, period, and on the FBI’s timetable.  
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On April 19, the government launched its second assault, which resulted in the 
fulfillment of Koresh’s doomsday prophecy. An FBI loud speaker issued another 
proclamation, which stated that Koresh’s 15 minutes of fame were at an end and 
demanding surrender. The FBI, believing in its own inherent morality, also proclaimed, 
“This is not an assault, do not fire or we will attack.”248 Yet, it clearly was an assault on 
the complex in which the government was once more the aggressor.249  
Government combat vehicles sprayed gas into the Mount Carmel Complex, and 
the Branch Davidians, fully engulfed in their own groupthink illusion, started firing at the 
armored vehicles, and launched gas rounds into the centers.250 Eventually, the vehicles 
begin smashing holes in the building so the Branch Davidians could escape. 
Unfortunately, this measure had the opposite effect and debris trapped people inside the 
buildings. The wreckage trapped many Branch Davidians who were hiding in a storage 
room.251 At noon, fires started in the complex. The FBI alleges that the Branch Davidians 
started the fires but these allegations are suspect because the Branch Davidians are 
fundamentalist Christians and to them suicide is a mortal sin. Survivors conversely claim 
that the burning teargas canisters started the fires. Very soon, the Mount Carmel complex 
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was engulfed in flames and only nine people survived the terrible inferno.252 Among 
them was Ruth Riddle, who had a computer disk with Koresh’s interpretation of the First 
Seal. Seventy-four people perished in the fire, among them 21 children under the age of 
14.253  
6. Conclusion 
This episode occurred and people perished because the government was negligent 
and ensconced in an environment of groupthink. On many occasions, government 
officials should have played the role of devil’s advocate and proposed alternatives to the 
established plans destined to end in tragedy. The BATF should have engaged with 
Koresh through the gun store owner, as a mutual contact in an attempt to interview him 
or apprehend him in a less dangerous location. The BATF and FBI leadership’s refusal to 
entertain peaceful solutions, as well as the refusal to abandon its flawed plans, 
demonstrates an overwhelming environment of groupthink, wherein the plan must be 
executed even in the face of immense and catastrophic failure. The Branch Davidians saw 
the siege and raids as the fulfillment of the Fifth Sign and the beginning of the Sixth Sign. 
It was also a fulfillment of their core social and cultural identity us-versus-them beliefs. 
Koresh prophesied that he was the Lamb who would be killed by the forces of Babylon, 
and through its negligent actions, the government fulfilled his prophesy. 
B. THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING MANHUNT 
The results of the investment in homeland security were perceptible during the 
April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing, which was the most noteworthy terrorist 
attack on American soil since September 11, 2001.  The term “Boston Strong” has been 
252 Eleven Branch Davidians were tried in Federal Court on various charges including conspiracy to 
murder federal agents. The government refused to recognize the Branch Davidians as a legitimate religious 
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Branch Davidians on all charges, two others were acquitted but held for immigration violations, five were 
convicted of aiding voluntary manslaughter, one was convicted of possessing a grenade, and one of 
unlawful possession of machine guns.  
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used frequently but never has it been more apt than when the Boston community formed 
a large-scale in-group within a day as law enforcement and the public rallied to mitigate 
the damage caused by the bombing. In less than a week, the perpetrators had been 
identified, apprehended, or neutralized. The Massachusetts community and the nation 
recovered quickly, which demonstrated that the homeland had become far more resilient 
then it had been prior to 9/11. The fear of terrorism that held the country in its grip 
following 9/11 affected the national community far less after the Boston Marathon 
bombing. Fear was supplanted by community defiance, which demonstrated that the 
investment in homeland security had accomplished a goal of making the nation more 
resilient to acts of terrorism.254  
It is not the intention of this case study to criticize the bravery of many of the 
emergency responders in this episode. Rather, it is to analyze the groupthink 
psychological phenomenon critically that played a role in the event. There were many 
victories for law enforcement were achieved during this period, and certainly, some were 
derived from critical thinking, as well as innovative law enforcement programs. Several 
less publicized failures also included self-deployment, tribalism, and mission creep 
between federal, state, and local emergency response agencies.  
This case study focuses on the homeland security enterprise’s response to the 
murder of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Police Officer Sean Collier, the 
Watertown manhunt, and the incidences of groupthink by the law enforcement tribal in-
group, including its senior leadership. Following the murder of the MIT Police Officer 
Sean Collier, a sweeping groupthink dominated the mindset of the law enforcement tribal 
in-group in the Boston area. Groupthink is commonplace when a law enforcement officer 
is injured or murdered in the line of duty. Fellow law enforcement officers driven by 
moral outrage often engage aggressive tactics to avenge their fallen comrade. This 
254 Darrel M. West and Marion Orr, “Managing Citizen Fears Public Attitudes Toward Urban 
Terrorism,” Urban Affairs Review 41, no. 1 (2005): 93–105, http://www.insidepolitics.org/Homeland 
Security.pdf. 
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response is commonplace in a warrior culture. Almost all officers who have served have 
engaged to a degree in similar activity at some point in their career.255  
Recently, both Harvard and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Police 
Executives Multi-Level Response Planning Committee issued after action reports that 
detailed both the successes and failures by the homeland security enterprise during the 
Boston Marathon bombing response, manhunt, and investigation.256 Many of the primary 
failures identified by the recent after action reviews were in part due to leadership’s 
inability to establish a unified command initially and the mismanagement of the volatile 
Watertown manhunt episode.257 Subsequent to the initial Laurel Street, Watertown 
shootout, a unified command was established, yet it faced challenges, particularly in its 
attempts to rein in the large number of first responder assets who deployed to this 
community.258 In Watertown, thousands of law enforcement officers descended upon the 
city, and many of these officers self-deployed or were deployed by their agencies without 
authorization from a unified command structure that turned the scene at times into 
chaos.259  
The groupthink fervor rose to such a level at the Laurel Street shoot-out scene and 
later at the location at which the second bomber was apprehended that these scenes 
became extremely unsafe, and turned into real-life shooting galleries. Responding to 
these locations were dozens of agencies and hundreds of officers that acted without a 
255 Hooley et al., “Boston Strong Is No Accident,” 2–5. 
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common command structure, standard operating procedures, communications, or a use of 
force policy.260  
While not a traditional form of groupthink, made by a decision-making body, it 
still is groupthink perpetrated by a highly cohesive group, the members of which have 
similar backgrounds and perspectives. When avenging a fallen comrade, the law 
enforcement tribal in-group often believes its actions to be morally righteous and 
collectively rationalizes their actions. Historically, leadership condones these actions 
amongst the in-group by vilifying the perpetrator. This is not to say that a person who 
assaults or murders a law enforcement officer is not a villain, but often in attempt to right 
the injustice, law enforcement succumbs to the groupthink to ensure the public views the 
perpetrator as such.  
1. The Murder of MIT Police Officer Sean Collier 
By Thursday April 18, four days after the Boston Marathon bombing, the suspects 
had been tentatively identified and their images had been released to the media by law 
enforcement. Later that evening, at approximately 10:00pm, an armed robbery occurred 
at a Cambridge Massachusetts 7/11 convenience store located on Massachusetts Avenue 
in Central Square. Nearby, MIT Police Officer Sean Collier was patrolling the MIT 
campus when he heard a radio call for the reported robbery. Officer Collier tactically 
positioned his vehicle in an over watch position on the corner of Vassar Street and Main 
Street in the direction that he believed that the suspect may be fleeing.261  
Area surveillance video later gathered by investigators in the ensuing 
investigation showed that at approximately 10:25pm, two suspects walked towards 
Officer Collier as he was sitting in his vehicle. The men approached from the rear of the 
vehicle and proceeded to fire five shots, and murdered Officer Collier. The two men 
quickly departed the area but soon returned and attempted to steal Officer Collier’s 
service firearm.262 They were unsuccessful in releasing Officer Collier’s firearm because 
260 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing.” 
261 Ibid.  
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of the security retention holster and they fled prior to responding law enforcement’s 
arrival.263  
The Middlesex County District Attorney Office supported by the Massachusetts 
State Police investigates officer-involved shootings. However, given the high 
concentration of law enforcement personnel in Boston and Cambridge following the 
bombing, and the quickly circulating reports that an officer had been shot, law 
enforcement officers from a multitude of agencies responded to the murder scene and 
surrounding area. The groupthink characteristic of law enforcement in-group self-
deploying and responding during an officer-down incident was magnified by the 
suspicion that the suspects in the shooting of Officer Collier were connected to the 
Marathon bombing.264  
2. The Manhunt Begins 
The massive manhunt and resulting groupthink episode began around midnight on 
April 19, 2013. At that time, a man reported that he was carjacked and kidnapped by a 
Middle Eastern man with a handgun a short distance away from the shooting scene on 
Brighton Avenue in the Allston neighborhood of Boston.265 The driver stated that the 
man had told him that he had had just shot a Cambridge police officer and that he had 
carried out the Boston Marathon bombing. The driver further stated that they had met a 
second man who was in an older vehicle. The driver claimed that he recognized him as 
one of the men in the photos of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects that had been 
released by the FBI earlier that day. The driver further reported that the two men moved 
several heavy items from the old car into his Mercedes SUV, and then drove back to 
Cambridge, where the two carjackers mentioned that they were leaving the area and they 
were traveling to New York. The driver said that they stopped at a gas station and he 
263 Globe Staff, “102 Hours in Pursuit of Marathon Suspects.” 
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managed to escape the vehicle when the suspect was distracted by a global positioning 
system (GPS).266  
3. The Laurel Street Shootout  
Area police were notified through the common radio frequency to be on the 
lookout for the two vehicles driven by the suspects in the carjacking and the murder of 
Officer Collier. After 12:30pm, the stolen vehicle was tracked by the former driver’s cell 
phone GPS to the city of Watertown, Massachusetts. Watertown officers located and 
began to follow the vehicle, which stopped on a pleasant and quiet but thickly settled 
residential neighborhood. One of the suspects exited the vehicle and began to fire his 
firearm at the officers. Officers from multiple jurisdictions began to respond as other 
Watertown officers arrived at the scene of the active gunfight. Many of the officers 
responding from neighboring cities and agencies were driven by the law enforcement 
groupthink that inspired their desire to avenge their fallen comrade. Moreover, driven by 
this vehemence, they were demonstrating, in effect, an illusion of invulnerability and 
moral superiority that enabled them to throw caution to the winds while engaging the 
suspect in an exchange of gunfire, even though so many residents of this bucolic 
suburban street were nearby in their homes.267  
While the officers and suspects exchanged fire, the suspects began to throw 
improvised explosive devices at the officers. Some exploded while others failed to 
detonate. Amid the chaos, the Watertown officers, who were within their own 
jurisdiction, coordinated their actions through a common radio channel. However, 
numerous other law enforcement officers, caught up in the groupthink epidemic, had self-
deployed and not coordinated with the local jurisdiction. These officers arrived en mass, 
which gave them a shared illusion of unanimity because they were a small part of the 
larger response.268  
266 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 19–21. 
267 Ibid., 20–22. 
268 Ibid., 20–21. 
 77 
                                                 
While a cohesive group can certainly succumb to groupthink, it is essential for 
modern domestic emergency management to establish a unified command structure to 
organize and manage the strategic and operational aspects of the critical incident. 
Homeland security professionals must recognize that the absence of coordination and 
massive self-deployment is a deadly combination that often makes a dangerous situation 
much worse. The lack of the initial unified command during the Watertown manhunt led 
to a confused situation in which basic law enforcement procedures were lost.269  
Hundreds of rounds were fired during the Laurel Street shootout. Crossfire among 
officers occurred especially when the younger brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, fled the area 
by driving through the crowd of officers. Dzhokhar attempted to ram his vehicle into the 
two officers taking his wounded brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev into custody but the officers 
jumped out of its path.270 Instead of hitting the officers, Dzhokhar ran over his own 
brother, and dragged him along the road and through another group of police.  
Law enforcement’s illusion of invulnerability was so ubiquitous that the crossfire 
was rampant. A round fired by an officer who was shooting at the fleeing Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev seriously wounded Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) Police 
Officer Richard Donohue. The massive and chaotic law enforcement response also 
snarled the immediate pursuit of the fleeing suspect. Officers embroiled in groupthink 
and mired in the illusion of invulnerability, rationalization, and moral certainty 
inadvertently fired rounds into residences, vehicles, and yards. Thankfully, no serious 
civilian casualties occurred, which was miraculous given how many residents reside in 
this area.271  
In the Laurel Street shootout, most officers desired only to help by responding 
quickly to an unfolding emergency situation. Officers also sought to avenge an injustice 
perpetrated against one of their own and the community but this desire took the form of 
269 Christina Pazzanese, “Measuring the Marathon, Analysis Lauds, Questions Aspects of Last April’s 
Response to Bombings, Coordination of Manhunt,” Harvard Gazette, April 3, 2014, http://news.harvard. 
edu/gazette/story/2014/04/measuring-the-marathon/. 
270 Globe Staff, “102 Hours in Pursuit of Marathon Suspects.” 
271 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 20–21, 
39. 
 78 
                                                 
an overarching environment of groupthink.272 This groupthink made the in-group of law 
enforcement believe that it was morally correct and it rationalized dangerous and 
sometimes irresponsible actions during the episode. The comprehensive groupthink 
episode also made the law enforcement in-group incorrectly believe that it was 
invulnerable to criticism because since it was fighting an enemy who had perpetrated an 
evil act on the community, and that the community unanimously supported its actions.273  
This type of self-deployment response in an emergency is a decentralized form of 
groupthink. It has been recently described as well in the Washington DC Naval Yard 
active shooter event and the Christopher Dorner manhunt in California.274 While it is not 
a traditional groupthink under the direction and influence of a dominant leader, it is part 
of the general law enforcement tribal in-group psyche.275 As part of this in-group, 
officers mistakenly believe that they have to play a decisive role in a historic incident. 
They believe that if they were not present or only held in reserve, they would not be 
fulfilling their social contract and duty to the in-group.  
As the events unfolded, the surviving suspect fled a few blocks and then 
abandoned the SUV and fled on foot. The massive response and lack of a unified 
command at this time led to several erroneous radio calls and reports that caused officers 
to respond to false leads.276 The glut of responding law enforcement vehicles prevented 
the initial pursuit of the fleeing suspect and also hindered the response of the 
Massachusetts State Police Bomb Squad to the Laurel Street shooting scene. Several 
undetonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were still in the area as officers 
congregated nearby. The EOD unit could not navigate its response vehicle down the 
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streets blocked by the gridlock of emergency response vehicles and personnel, frustrating 
its efforts to arrive at the scene and render those items safe.277  
Just as officers were drawn to the Laurel Street shooting scene, so too were senior 
leaders. Whether these senior leaders intended on providing mutual aid to Watertown or 
if they were drawn to the location by the same groupthink atmosphere that had motivated 
so many of their officers, they eventually recognized that they needed to establish a 
unified command and take control of the situation. To the credit of the senior leaders, 
they determined that the shooting scene was not the ideal area for a command post so 
they established the unified command at a nearby mall. The unified command recognized 
the self-deployment situation and realized it needed to establish an enormous perimeter to 
prevent the subject’s escape. The unified command attempted to coordinate the mass 
response of officers into a somewhat orderly perimeter but it mistakenly was focused on 
the shooting scene, and not the area of at which the suspect abandoned his vehicle and 
fled on foot.278  
4. The Unified Command is Established 
Once the unified command was established, the immediate situation was 
stabilized and many of the self-deployed officers were accounted for and coordinated into 
an organized response. While a cohesive unified command group can degrade into a 
groupthink decision-making process, it did not occur in this situation. The senior 
leadership used critical thinking and effective decision making to quell the chaos and 
brought it somewhat under the control. The command decided to use the large number 
responding tactical teams and other special units to begin a coordinated house-to-house 
search of the entire area in an attempt to locate the suspect. While the constitutionality of 
the searches has been debated, the decision by the leadership was courageous because it 
risked controversy. The searches of residences were generally conducted through 
277 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 22. 
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consent, although it can be debated if it was actually consent since it was armed officers 
asking for permission at the homeowner’s front door.279 
During this time, the unified command acted in an organized manner by 
employing critical thinking to make decisions on how to best locate the suspect, and how 
to use the flood of law enforcement officers who responded most efficiently. Leadership 
also examined the various scenarios of why the suspects had fled to Watertown, their 
motivations, and how officers might best apprehend the suspect who remained at large. 
The governor and area mayors supported the senior leadership. In an effort to prevent the 
suspect from slipping out of the perimeter during the busy morning commute, 
government leaders made the decision to ask local communities to shelter in place. Public 
transportation was suspended and the community widely adhered to this request.280  
Throughout the day the search continued. By this time, dozens of agencies were 
present along with many of New England’s specialized and tactical units.281 The 
groupthink self-deployment that occurred raises an important question. If the bulk of 
resources immediately rush to a scene, will sufficient resources be left to relieve the 
original responders if the event becomes drawn-out? Furthermore, in the Watertown 
scenario, few resources remained to respond to everyday incidents, as well as suspicious 
activity reports from outside the area of the Watertown scene that nevertheless might be 
related. With such a large portion of the homeland security enterprises resources 
committed to the one scene, response to additional events was severely hampered.282  
In a series done by WGBH Boston, Watertown Police Chief Ed Deveau was 
asked who was in charge that night. Chief Deveau answered, “Nobody. We literally just 
sat around a table and made all the decisions collectively. Whether it was 5 a.m. with 
[Boston Mayor Tom Menino and Gov. Deval Patrick] on the phone, and we tossed 
around the ideas of what we were going to do—shut down just Watertown, or are we 
going to make it a bigger area? And we really went around the table and came to a group 
279 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 22–26. 
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decision, and that’s what followed the whole day. So, there was no one that had any 
bigger voice than the person sitting beside him.”283 This response is interesting. It would 
appear the unified command structure did not have dominant leaders directing the group. 
Chief Deveau gives the impression that all participants’ voices were equal and the 
various participants’ alternative perspectives were considered. If this scenario did occur, 
the unified command group engaged in several of Janis’s remedies to mitigate 
groupthink.  
5. The One-Way Shoot Out and the Final Takedown 
Leadership recognized that they could not ask the community to shelter for an 
indefinite period. Thus, at approximately 6:00pm, Governor Deval Patrick, in 
consultation with the unified command, lifted the order even though the remaining 
suspect had not been located. Many officers began to drift away from the area because 
with the order lifted, the urgency that propelled their self-deployment was dissipating.284 
Many of the self-deployed officers had been in the area for hours; therefore, fatigue 
began to take its toll and they began to depart.285  
As the scene quieted, within a very short time after the shelter in place order was 
lifted, a resident several blocks from Laurel Street who had stepped out into his yard to 
get some air noticed that the shrink-wrap covering his boat, which had been stored in his 
yard, was disturbed. He looked further and found a man hiding inside the boat under the 
shrink-wrap cover. The resident called authorities and reported what he had seen. 
Quickly, a senior officer responded and then called on the radio for the assistance of a 
tactical team.286  
A large number of officers descend upon the location from all sides, with poor 
coordination, putting themselves and the local residents again into a potentially 
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284 Globe Staff, “102 Hours in Pursuit of Marathon Suspects.” 
285 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 26, 35–
36. 
286 Ibid., 26. 
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dangerous situation that might have resulted in a crossfire. As numerous officers from 
several agencies made their initial approach to the boat, the suspect used a fishing gaff to 
raise the covering so he could peer out. Several officers mistook the gaff for a rifle so 
officers fired at the boat from all sides.287  
This eruption of gunfire by the officers was inspired by a groupthink mindset. The 
officers fired hundreds of rounds at the boat for over 10 seconds even though the suspect 
did not possess a weapon or fire at police. However, the suspect had murdered one of the 
law enforcement in-group, as well as allegedly participated in the marathon bombing. By 
this time, the suspect had been thoroughly dehumanized in the minds of the responding 
law enforcement in-group, the members of which felt so morally correct that they did not 
immediately comprehend that a hail of gunfire in a densely populated neighborhood was 
inappropriate and dangerous. This large in-group of law enforcement officers felt 
invulnerable, anonymous, and unaccountable for their actions.288  
When Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was discovered, many officers from different agencies 
responded to the area and a groupthink attitude of vigilantism, agency competition, and 
self-promotion emerged. Some officers refused to follow the orders of the unified 
command if not given directly by a supervisor in their own agency.289 Significant in-
group out-group conflict among competing law enforcement agencies over which 
agencies would take up what positions caused disagreement and confusion. The 
wrangling between agencies became so contentious that officers on scene were not 
adhering to the unified commands direction; rather, they were following their own course 
of action or an outside chain of commands orders. For example, a tactical officer from a 
jurisdiction outside of Watertown attempted to dismiss a Watertown officer who had 
been positioned at a pivotal location by the unified command. The tactical officer had 
been stationed there by his own independent command, without the knowledge of the 
unified command.290 Thus, conflict occurred. 
287 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 26–27. 
288 Globe Staff, “102 Hours in Pursuit of Marathon Suspects.” 
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The scene eventually came under control of the unified command and the 
situation around the boat containing the suspect became more stable. The unified 
command ensured that the perimeter was secured and officers were positioned so that 
they were not in each other’s line of fire. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and the 
Massachusetts State Police working as part of the unified command took control of the 
scene, focused their experience, and combined resources on evaluating the situation. 
They clearly understood that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev had access to improvised explosive 
devices so they used multiple resources including the State Police helicopters video link 
to observe the subject inside the boat. They also employed an explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) robot to cut away the shrink-wrap covering and concussion grenades to 
encourage the suspect to surrender.291  
During the final takedown, multiple tactical teams jockeyed for relevance and 
positions. When the subject stood up and surrendered, several tactical teams, rather than 
one designated by leaders, abandoned their positions and rushed the boat to take the 
suspect into custody. The desire of the various tactical team in-groups to be in on the 
final takedown was so overwhelming they lost control. Influenced by an illusion of 
invulnerability and competition to take part in a historically significant events, caused 
tactical team in-groups to risk their own lives and jeopardize the operation. Be that as it 
may, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was taken into custody about 8.45pm and transported to a 
Boston trauma center for treatment of the wounds he had sustained during the firefight 
and manhunt.292 
6. The Boston Marathon Bombing Manhunt Lessons Learned  
This thesis case study examines the failures on a sociological and psychological 
level that occurred during the Watertown manhunt and discusses the incidences of 
groupthink that resulted. The goal of the thesis is to make the homeland security 
enterprise aware of these mistakes and so that the lessons learned will not be repeated. 
Two significant failures that were the catalyst for all the other problems that occurred 
291 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 27. 
292 Ibid., 27, 37–40. 
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were the initial lack of a unified command structure and first responder self-deployment. 
Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard of the Harvard Kennedy School & Harvard Business 
School, and one of the co-contributors of the report, “Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons 
from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” stated, “From the very beginning, as soon as the 
bombs went off, the instinct of a bunch of the senior commanders was, ‘I have to find X.’ 
But at the tactical level, people arrived and felt authorized to exercise individual 
initiative, their own commanders weren’t there,” so “they just mostly plunged in and did 
things individually. You can understand why that is, but that’s a real issue.”293  
Another co-contributor, Christine M. Cole, executive director of the Program in 
Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Harvard Kennedy School & Harvard 
Business School, summarized the self-deployment issue eloquently when she stated, “At 
what point is one more person with a gun not very useful?” She continued by saying, 
“And that’s what was happening … a tribe of people were showing up unconnected to 
each other and then were acting on their own authority without anybody saying, ‘Whoa, 
what are we doing here?”294  
Cole’s statement perfectly summarizes the major issue of the self-deployment 
groupthink law enforcement mindset that encourages all officers to believe they must 
respond to the scene. These officers were motivated by the groupthink typical throughout 
the homeland security enterprise that is inspired by the desire to avenge wrongs against 
the United States and to avenge those perpetrated against a member of their own in-
group. Some of the motivation is a desire to help but another motivation is based on the 
eagerness to take part in a significant or even historic event. This second-mentioned 
motivation is far less altruistic and selfish to a degree because by self-deploying officers 
are abandoning their primary mission or post to seek glory and self-fulfillment. Had other 
conspirators or groups been inspired by the bombing or involved in it, the region would 
293 Pazzanese, “Measuring the Marathon, Analysis Lauds, Questions Aspects of Last April’s Response 
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have been vulnerable to a second strike because so many law enforcement assets were 
concentrated in one location with very little left in reserve.295  
7. Former Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis’s Counter-Point 
Ed Davis, the former Boston Police Commissioner and a senior leader during the 
marathon crisis, is currently a Spring Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard 
Kennedy School & Harvard Business School. He was also a key co-contributor to the 
Harvard report and is credited with suggesting that the report detail not only the successes 
but also the failures that occurred in response. 
In his counterpoint, Davis discusses that self-deployment maybe a reaction to 
autocratic law enforcement command. Davis offered the counterpoint to his co-authors 
opinions that generally asserted that self-deployment is a hindrance to a homeland 
security operation. Davis stated, “There’s one group of police leaders who want to 
maintain complete control over everything that happens, and that’s sort of an autocratic 
way of looking at it. There are other police leaders, and I would include myself in this 
group, [who say] that in the middle of a firefight like that, you’re looking for all the help 
you can get, and you’re looking for it quickly. Anybody that can pour fire onto a target 
when your officers are under attack like that, with bombs and guns, is welcome.”296 
Davis may be correct in certain situations in which the command in-group is so focused 
upon its groupthink agenda that it refuses to deviate from a doomed course of action. 
However, in the Boston Marathon Bombing, self-deployment was caused by a mob 
groupthink mentality and it led to several serious problems during this episode.  
In the report, Davis further states, “I personally don’t see a problem with self-
deployment in this situation, except that we don’t train tactics around military encounters. 
We don’t train police officers like that in the United States. We train them for the type of 
encounters that police most often get involved in with firearms, and that is a one-on-one 
295 Pazzanese, “Measuring the Marathon, Analysis Lauds, Questions Aspects of Last April’s Response 
to Bombings, Coordination of Manhunt,” 35–38.  
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encounter within 6 to 8 feet, where people pull guns out and fire at each other.”297 
Davis’s point is based on a tactical not strategic thought process and he contradicts 
himself when he admitted that local police officers do not train for these types of intense 
combat situations and recommends that to cope with these issues effectively, additional 
training would be needed.298  
8. Failure to Initially Establish a Unified Command 
The Harvard report finds the failure to establish effective unified command during 
the Watertown Manhunt was “one of the most persistent and troubling weaknesses”299 of 
the entire event. At the beginning, on late April 18th and early morning April 19th, much 
of the senior leadership was as caught up in the groupthink epidemic and it failed to 
predict the fluidity and volatility of the situation. Many of the senior leaders rushed to the 
Laurel Street shooting scene and congregated in that location. Whereas, they should have 
been establishing a unified command in a secure location, from which to make strategic 
decisions rather than making operational command decisions at the shooting scene that 
could be delegated to subordinates. The initial lack of strategic organization by senior 
leadership demonstrates that even senior leaders can be influenced by the groupthink, 
which says that they must be on scene and part of the tactical response instead of 
establishing a unified command center from which strategic decisions can be made.  
Senior leaders should leave tactical decisions to lower ranking offices and need to 
focus on directing the strategic course of the operation, make contingency or alternative 
courses of action, and anticipate the opposition’s next moves. Once command is 
established, it must maintain control. Even after the Watertown unified command was 
established, however, it failed to assert its authority completely over the law enforcement 
officers who were mired in groupthink and had self-deployed because they believed that 
they must be part of the important homeland security event. These officers acted in an 
independent and sometimes irresponsible fashion that jeopardized the operation and 
297 Pazzanese, “Measuring the Marathon, Analysis Lauds, Questions Aspects of Last April’s Response 
to Bombings, Coordination of Manhunt,” 35–38. 
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officer safety because they were willfully blinded by the law enforcement in-group’s 
collective groupthink.300  
9. Recommended Protocol for Managing Critical Incidents 
A year following this incident, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Police 
Executives’ Multi-Level Response Planning Committee, has authored a policy based 
upon the lessons learned from the Boston Marathon bombing and the tactical, strategic, 
and sociological problems that were identified.301  
This “Recommended Protocol for Managing Initial Response to Critical 
Incidents” report states,  
Uncontrolled deployments (sometimes referred to as self-deployment or 
self-dispatching), although initiated with good intentions, can create 
confusion, wreak havoc at crime and emergency scenes, and can lead to 
the destruction or inadmissibility of evidence, or injuries to self-
dispatching individuals or assigned personnel. They are to be avoided. 
These and other forms of unauthorized and / or unreported presence at 
incidents / events, and unauthorized departures there from are inconsistent 
with ICS principals, and may not be eligible for compensation or 
reimbursement. The highest ranking supervisor responding from each 
agency is responsible for the control and coordination of all personnel 
from that agency and will coordinate that agency’s response with the 
Incident Commander. The responding supervisor is responsible for 
deploying only the amount of personnel needed and requested by the 
Incident Commander.302  
Once again, this report identified two of the principal problems with the marathon 
response as self-deployment and the establishment of a unified command. Homeland 
security partners must coordinate their responses with an established unified command to 
avoid uncontrolled deployment and must also be accountable for their personnel.  
300 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 33–39. 
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10. Conclusion 
Both the Harvard report and Massachusetts State Police have engaged in critical 
thinking and analysis. They have made recommendations for improved crisis training to 
alleviate confusion, improve discipline and coordination of response, and to mitigate 
cross-fire situations. These reports also stress that all personnel regardless of rank or 
agency should be under the command and control of the Unified Incident Commander 
and senior leaders of each agency are responsible for ensuring their personnel adhere to 
the chain of command.303  
C. THE BROWN STANDOFF A GROUPTHINK COUNTERPOINT  
The groupthink fiasco at the Mount Carmel Complex and the resulting series of 
mistakes that led to the deaths of dozens of people has been analyzed and evaluated by 
both academics, as well as law enforcement professionals, in an effort to avoid similar 
catastrophic failures. The Edward and Elaine Brown standoff that began in April 2006, 
was an example of how the lessons learned at Waco were applied to produce a positive 
outcome to a volatile and dangerous homeland security situation. Prior to the standoff, 
the Browns were indicted in the U.S. State’s District Court for violations of the federal 
tax code, which were estimated to be $625,000 for Ed Brown and $1,310,706 for Elaine 
Brown. When the court proceedings appeared to be turning against them, they refused to 
leave their property and they were convicted in absentia for not claiming $1.9 million of 
taxable income. They were sentenced to serve 63 months in federal prison and to pay a 
$215,890 fine.304 
1. The Brown In-Group 
The Browns were influential leaders in the Constitutional Rangers militia 
organization, one of the largest militia groups in North America. The Browns claimed 
that federal income tax was illegal and it was never properly ratified to the U.S. 
303 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Police Executives’ Multi–Level Response Planning Committee, 
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304 Badkhen, “Marshals’ Ploy Ended Standoff Peacefully, Acted Like Supporters to Lure Out Tax 
Evaders.” 
 89 
                                                 
Constitution. Prior to their conviction, and before they could be taken into custody, the 
Browns secluded themselves on their property in rural Plainfield, New Hampshire. The 
Browns lived in a large fortified house that had a stockpile of weapons, supplies, and its 
own wind and solar power sources. The home was sheltered on 152-acre property, and it 
is constructed of thick concert walls, it also contained a large turret with a 360-degree 
firing position at its peak.305  
Ed Brown publically proclaimed that he would never go to jail and he would 
aggressively defend himself against the government. Fellow Constitutional Rangers and 
other supporters steeped in an “us-versus-them” social identity rallied to the Browns, and 
became their personal in-group. Some took up residence on the Browns’ property and 
swore to defend the Browns against the government. A high profile in-group militia 
movement figure Randy Weaver visited the Browns and made a public proclamation 
pledging his support. Weaver was the subject in the 1992 standoff with the federal 
government at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, where his wife, son, and Deputy U.S. Marshal 
William Degan, were killed.306  
Edward Brown reputably made challenges bolstering his us-versus-them view 
threatening,  
I wouldn’t want to be this U.S. attorney. I wouldn’t want to be this judge 
or these other people. This James John or anybody else that decides to 
come down here. Their names are already out there… They are just as 
vulnerable as I am. And if they’re so foolish and stupid to think that 
they’re not, hey, doom on them.” A “hit list” was circulated by radicals in 
the militia community that included the local, county, state and federal 
officials, some of whom received protection from the government.307  
The Browns believed Freemasons, Zionists, and the secret Illuminati have 
perpetrated a vast global conspiracy on the American people. Brown and his supporters 
305Associated Press, “Ruby Ridge Figure Visits N.H. Tax Evaders, Advises Couple, Warns U.S. 
Agents,” The Boston Globe, June 19, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/local/new_hampshire/articles/ 
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Contrary,” The Concord Monitor, April 27, 2007, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/browns-cache-
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believed that they were morally righteous because they were defending the nation against 
this conspiracy. The Brown in-group dehumanized the government officials to make 
them into members of an evil, shadowy government conspiracy bent on subjugating 
society. Brown threatened that if law enforcement agents stormed his property, he and his 
in-group would defend themselves with deadly force to repel the incursion. He also said 
that if he or his wife were killed, then his in-group would murder the local Police Chief 
and the County Sheriff. Brown was convinced this encounter was the beginning of the 
people’s war against the global conspiracy and he was waiting for the government to 
assault his compound to initiate this conflict.308  
2. The U.S. Marshal Service Exercises Critical Thinking 
The U.S. Marshals Service was charged with executing the arrest warrant to take 
Ed and Elaine Brown into custody. The Marshals Service, along with its state and local 
partners, recognized that the Brown home was a well-fortified and defendable location, 
with numerous secure shooting positions, from which the defenders could fire on any law 
enforcement team that approached. It was a very dangerous situation for law enforcement 
officers and they realized how vulnerable they were in the event of a violent 
confrontation. The Marshals did not want to enable the Brown’s agenda of martyrdom 
and understood that a full-scale siege of the property would attract media attention, 
sympathy, and support. It would also give the Browns the tactical advantage of time to 
plan for the impending assault and estimate law enforcement’s capabilities and methods 
of attack. Taking into account the lessons learned at other standoffs with similar groups, 
such as those at Waco and Ruby Ridge, the Marshals Service recognized a large-scale 
siege or assault would most likely end in significant bloodshed, which would grant Ed 
Brown exactly what he desired, to be a martyr and rallying symbol for his envisioned 
people’s war.309 
308 Kristen Senz, “Brown: War Is Coming,” Manchester Union Leader, August 10, 2007.  
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The Marshals Service exercised critical thinking, and used the lessons learned 
from the tragedy at Waco to formulate a low profile operation plan that was the opposite 
of traditional law enforcement raid or siege techniques. This standoff was never truly a 
standoff because government agents did not lay siege to the Brown residence and Brown 
supporters came and went of their own free will. The Chief Deputy Marshal responded to 
Ed Brown’s challenges and proclamation by establishing regular telephonic contract with 
the Browns, and engaged them and humanized law enforcement in their minds through 
these personal conversations. The Marshals Service decided to defuse the situation by 
waiting approximately nine months for the Brown in-group to dwindle and to become 
complacent.310  
On October 4, 2007, with winter approaching in western New Hampshire, 
undercover deputy marshals infiltrated the Browns’ property by acting as supporters. 
Undercover deputies arrested the Browns, while they were alone and inside the residence 
that evening. The Browns were taken unaware. They were arrested without incident 
before they and their in-group of supporters could react and defend themselves.  
U.S. Marshal Monier of the Concord New Hampshire office stated, “Ultimately, 
this open-door policy that they seemed to have which allowed the Browns to have some 
supporters bring them supplies, welcome followers and even host a picnic—this 
proved to be their undoing … They invited us in. We escorted them out.”311 
Monier also commented, “The Browns may now begin serving their 63-month federal 
prison terms. High profile situations like this are always difficult, but they don’t have to 
be tragic. I’m glad no one was injured, and that the community remained safe 
throughout the operation.”312  
Subsequent to the arrests, federal authorities reportedly discovered a bomb-
making factory, 20 pipe bombs, nine destructive devices, booby traps, IEDs, smoke 
310 WMUR Staff and the Associated Press, “Marshals Posed As Supporters to Arrest Browns, Couple 
Arrested After Lengthy Standoff in Plainfield Home,” WMUR, last modified October 5, 2007, http://www. 
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grenades, and other bomb making components on the property. The authorities also 
discovered at least 20 firearms including two. 50-caliber rifles and more than 60,000 
rounds of ammunition.313 This arsenal of weapons could have been employed to create 
serious devastation had the Marshals conducted a traditional law enforcement raid. 
However, the Marshals Service engaged in critical thinking by using the lessons learned 
from Waco to avoid unnecessary conflict that is at times a byproduct of law enforcement 
groupthink. The Marshals Service developed contingency plans and used devil’s 
advocacy to access the situation and continually reform the plan of action.  
3. Conclusion 
The Browns were anticipating a Waco-style, dynamic assault on their residence 
and had a significant stockpile of arms to resist it. The Marshals Service assessed the 
situation and understood that the Browns’ philosophy and motivation was aimed at 
forcing the government into a violent confrontation. The U.S. Marshals Service did not 
submit to the groupthink law enforcement mentality. Instead, it embraced critical 
thinking and creativity to solve the problem of taking the Browns into custody while 
minimizing risk to law enforcement, the community, the Browns, and their supporters.  
The Marshals Service decision makers understood that they were in a vulnerable 
position and needed to consult with outside experts, including the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, the New Hampshire State Police, and other entities to formulate their plan. 
Moreover, they did not allow the Browns to goad them into a no-win situation. Instead, 
they engaged the Browns in a regular verbal discourse to humanize the deputies who 
would eventually arrest the Browns. Through this contact, the Marshals Service also 
became educated about the Browns’ beliefs, which challenged both parties’ perceptions 
of the opposition.  
The Marshals’ patient, calculated, and surreptitious response negated the Browns’ 
proclamations that they would violently resist. Due to the critical thinking, devil’s 
advocacy, alternative planning, and refusal to engage in groupthink, the Marshals Service 
313 Margot Sanger–Katz, “Browns’ Cache One of the Biggest,” Concord Monitor, October 31, 2007, 
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limited the risk to both the subjects and law enforcement officers. It also negated the 
Browns’ preconceived agenda by not responding in the anticipated way with a dynamic 
assault, which the Browns could make into a public spectacle that rallied sympathizers to 
their cause.  
 94 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The problem of groupthink is common in homeland security with an impact 
throughout the enterprise, although some areas are more significantly affected while 
others show little to no sign of this syndrome. The groupthink environment is part of the 
fabric of the post-9/11 government, in which partisan politics are paramount and 
important issues, such as the security of the nation have become secondary. Only through 
a concerted effort to change the culture of the homeland security enterprise can 
groupthink be mitigated. However, given the current political framework of the homeland 
security enterprise, it will be difficult to eliminate groupthink enterprise-wide. 
Nevertheless, the problem can be effectively alleviated if situations in which groupthink 
has been detected are isolated and examined.314  
A. GROUPTHINK: THE GOOD AND BAD IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
Based on the research described in this thesis, it is apparent that some areas of 
homeland security are significantly affected by the groupthink psychological 
phenomenon while others show little to no sign of this syndrome. By analyzing case 
studies that identify both of these outcomes, homeland security professionals can develop 
and establish a framework to effectively mitigate the groupthink psychological 
phenomenon.315  
1. Homeland Security Leadership’s Insulation  
Several homeland security organizations and leadership elements visibly exhibit 
the antecedent conditions of groupthink. The former Secret Service hierarchy that took 
over the leadership of the FAMS following 9/11 was a cohesive group that shared similar 
backgrounds and belief systems. This cohesive senior leadership in-group insulated itself 
from external opinions and had little contact with the everyday reality of the agency 
314 Albert R. Hunt, “The Overkill in Homeland Security,” The New York Times, July 6, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/us/politics/the-overkill-in-homeland-security.html?_r=0. 
315 Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Operations Process (ADP 5–0, No. 5–0, FM 5–0) 
(Washington, DC: Army Doctrine Publication, 2012), 8, https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html. 
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mission or the employees who fulfilled that mission. The detachment was evident when 
the former Secret Service in-group made faulty and inappropriate policy decisions in 
isolation without input from experienced agency employees who were subject-matter 
experts in the FAM mission. Opposing opinions were discredited or censored by this 
management in-group, which believed that its employees were inferior or unqualified to 
offer legitimate viewpoints.316  
2. Homeland Security Leadership Bias 
Often, the function of decision-making groups in homeland security is to promote 
and legitimize the predetermined biased decisions of the leadership.317 Members censor 
their doubts about faulty plans and soft-pedal their disagreements, and thus, allow their 
objections to be overwhelmed or discredited. President Kennedy’s in-group prior to the 
Bay of Pigs fiasco did not express its doubts or misgivings about the flawed plan or 
follow the “Recommended Protocol for Managing Initial Response to Critical Incidents,” 
from the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, because they feared that they 
would be expelled from the president’s in-group.318 Similarly, homeland security 
officials often censor their disagreement with leadership’s faulty decisions because they 
value their personal membership and position within the in-group more than they value 
the success of the organization and the security of the nation.319  
3. Homeland Security’s Belief in its Own Inherent Morality 
An intrinsic fault in the homeland security enterprise relates to Janis’s groupthink 
symptoms pertaining to the overestimation of the power and morality of the in-group. 
Many homeland security officials are well meaning but too often believe in the absolute 
truth and morality of their mission, and therefore, discount its impact on society and the 
ethics of the homeland security policies and decisions.  
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The government entities that participated in the assault and the resulting siege on 
the Branch Davidian Mount Carmel complex believed that they were acting for the 
greater good of society. The BATF perceived that it would assail the complex with such 
shock-and-awe force that the occupants would be overwhelmed. The BATF’s illusion of 
invulnerability and excessive optimism was so great and misguided that leaders of these 
agencies did not develop contingency plans, did not see recognize faults in their plans, 
nor fully assess the organization and effectiveness of the Branch Davidian defensive 
capabilities. Instead of attempting to interview Koresh or take him into custody outside of 
the compound, the BATF desired to make a spectacular display of force, by taking an 
extreme risk by assaulting the fortified complex that cause the deaths of several BATF 
agents and Branch Davidians.320  
4. Homeland Security Collective Rationalization 
Collective rationalization and closed-mindedness are also symptoms of 
groupthink within homeland security. The establishment of modern homeland security 
evolved after government’s failure to recognize the escalation of attacks by al Qaeda 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. A loose network of affiliated in-groups perpetrated 
many of the attacks with which al Qaeda has been credited, but still, the pattern of 
aggression directed toward the United States by these organizations was rationalized and 
downplayed by homeland security decision makers. At that time, the government’s 
perception portrayed al Qaeda as an enemy that was too evil to engage, as well as too 
weak and dim-witted to pose a legitimate threat. To the contrary, the original al Qaeda 
leadership was a sophisticated, educated, and well-funded in-group that established a 
confederation of loosely affiliated groups that perpetrated attacks against the west in an 
escalating manner.  
With each successive attack, al Qaeda became bolder and better at its craft.321 
Yet, the increasing threat against the U.S. homeland was downplayed by both the Clinton 
320 Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An investigation, 36–38. 
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and Bush administrations. Both administrations submitted to the groupthink 
rationalization that these attacks would not occur in the homeland and the terrorist 
group’s leadership was to evil to address or communicate with, and not sophisticated 
enough to mount a large-scale devastating attack against the United States.322  
During the manhunt for the Boston Marathon Bombers in Watertown, a number 
of homeland security professionals collectively rationalized irresponsible and dangerous 
actions. While some of these actions were committed in self-defense, others were 
gratuitous, and jeopardized the safety of members of the community and fellow 
officers.323 
5. Homeland Security’s Pressure toward Uniformity and Conformity 
Homeland security’s groupthink habitually conforms to the current governing 
political leadership’s in-groups agenda. For every wave of political leadership, a change 
in mission focus results.324 The DHS’s pressure toward uniformity on its employees is a 
disturbing aspect of its groupthink. Deviation from the leadership in-group consensus can 
result in censorship because critical thinking, constructive criticism, and dissent directed 
toward the leadership’s biased agendas, are frequently dealt with harshly.325  
Critical analysis and constructive criticism are often seen as opposition to 
leadership, which results in direct pressure on the dissenter and frequently expulsion of 
the dissenter to an out-group. When confronted with groupthink, homeland security 
officials who wish to advance in their careers must stifle, minimize, or soft-peddle their 
viewpoints or risk being censured.326 The homeland security enterprise has countless 
322 Eichenwald, “The Deafness Before the Storm.” 
323 Leonard et al., ““Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 26. 
324 Schafer and Crichlow, Groupthink Versus High–Quality Decision Making in International 
Relations. 
325 Barnett and Ahlers, Report on Federal Air Marshal Service Paints an Unflattering Picture. 
326 Swanson, “Enhancing Red Team Performance: Driving Measurable Value and Quality Outcomes 
with Process Improvement.”  
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gifted employees who have been labeled as outliers and expelled from the political in-
group, and their careers harmed because they challenged leadership in-groups.327  
As with the former Secret Service officials who took over the FAMS, each 
successive wave of homeland security leadership instills its own cronies into leadership 
positions.328 Some are swept away with the political tides but others survive and conform 
to the groupthink of the next leadership wave. Only those employees willing to 
compromise their integrity, as well as the nation’s security, manage to ride the continuous 
series of political waves, survive, and thrive in the oppressive environment. These 
employees often act as the mindguards, to everyone’s detriment.329  
6. Groupthink Counterpoints 
Several homeland security decisions have been the antithesis of groupthink and 
offer a positive model on which to base future leadership and decision-making strategies. 
The U.S. Marshal’s Service’s planning of the clandestine apprehension of the Browns, 
which avoided an extended standoff and a dangerous assault on the Brown residence, is a 
prime example of a decision-making group using critical thinking and lessons learned 
from past fiascos to avoid groupthink and a potentially disastrous scenario.330  
A model decision made by a homeland security leader attempting to mitigate 
groupthink is President Obama’s employment of General Allen to lead the U.S. effort to 
build the international coalition against ISIS. General Allen has publically challenged and 
opposed many of the administration’s policies. However, the president recognized that 
Allen is a subject matter expert who may also play the role of devil’s advocate by 
offering alternative courses of action that the president and his in-group may not have 
considered.331 Both the Brown apprehension and the appointment of a General Allen are 
327 Swanson, “Enhancing Red Team Performance: Driving Measurable Value and Quality Outcomes 
with Process Improvement.” 
328 MacLean and Anonymous Federal Air Marshal, “Air Marshals and the Secret Service Factor.” 
329 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
41–43.  
330 WMUR Staff and the Associated Press, “Marshals Posed As Supporters to Arrest Browns, Couple 
Arrested After Lengthy Standoff in Plainfield Home.”  
331 Lake and Rogan, “Can Obama Keep His Generals in Check in the War Against ISIS?.” 
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exceptional examples for homeland security leaders attempting to avoid groupthink and 
promote high-quality decision making. These cases should be studied and emulated by 
homeland security leadership that wishes to counter groupthink to prevent future 
groupthink fiascos.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO MITIGATE GROUPTHINK IN HOMELAND 
SECURITY  
This research project has identified both Janis’s groupthink antecedent conditions 
and symptoms in many homeland security organizations and has found that the 
groupthink physiological phenomenon does have a negative impact on the security of the 
United States. However, because of the sheer size and fragmented nature of the homeland 
security, it is impossible for groupthink to be uniformly spread across the entire 
enterprise, and it is also impossible to eradicate this psychological phenomenon 
thoroughly.  
This research project recommends the homeland security enterprise use Janis’s 
established techniques, which have successfully mitigated groupthink in the past, to offer 
solutions to help identify, manage, and diminish this syndrome in homeland security.  
1. The Use of Janis’s Groupthink Remedies to Mitigate Groupthink in 
Homeland Security 
Homeland security employs highly experienced and intelligent professionals who 
are dedicated to the mission of protecting the homeland. Homeland security leaders must 
engage with the entire enterprise community including the employees, first responders, 
private industry innovators, academics, scientists, and the American people. These groups 
can offer innovative ideas and an alternative perspective that challenges the commonly 
held beliefs of the homeland security leadership. Through this engagement, homeland 
security leaders can refocus the mission of homeland security onto the protection of the 
nation rather than making it a repository for every political agenda being put forth by the 
current political in-group.332 
332 Kennedy, “The Hijacking of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Groupthink and Presidential Power 
in the Post–9/11 World,” 633–727. 
 100 
                                                 
Change to homeland security groupthink condition will require an organizational 
culture that values and encourages creativity, critical thinking, and critical self-analysis. 
Janis’s recommendations for remedies to overcome groupthink should be the framework 
that homeland security professionals employ to create a resilient organizational structure 
and environment and discourage this perilous psychological phenomenon. One of Janis’s 
key recommendations is that each group member should be encouraged to act as a 
“critical evaluator” or “devil’s advocate” who airs objections and doubts. Leaders should 
accept criticism and discourage the members from “soft-pedaling their disagreements.” 
President Kennedy employed this recommendation during his successful management of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis,333 and as noted previously, this same recommendation that 
encourages critical evolution and devil’s advocacy has been used by President Obama in 
his selection of former General John Allen, a conservative critic, as his lead in the U.S. 
led international counter-ISIS collation.334 
As President Kennedy learned during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, homeland security 
leaders should avoid expressing their own personal preference or agendas to the decision-
making group.335 While the chain of command is important, the leader must not unduly 
influence the group so that members can offer various courses of action not biased toward 
the leader’s preference. If the group is allowed to develop its own thought process and 
come to decisions free from influence, it will provide leadership with options that it 
might not have considered and that can be debated prior to making the final decision.  
The decision-making group should be divided into subgroups that meet 
independently to debate the decisions and work on alternative plans. While it may be 
difficult in an emergency situation, it is a necessary step in the process for groups that 
have the luxury of time to develop their decisions. Subgroups should bring their 
observations, findings, and recommendations back to the main group to debate these and 
discuss changes to the original plan. This process should be repeated several times with 
333 Janis, “Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes,” 
132–158. 
334 Lake and Rogan, “Can Obama Keep His Generals in Check in the War Against ISIS?.” 
335 Ibid., 14–47. 
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different members composing the subgroups each time to ensure fresh viewpoints and 
challenges.336 If the situation permits, the homeland security decision-making process 
should include several independent groups debating the same policy question, each under 
the direction of a different leader. This inclusion would be difficult to achieve in a time-
sensitive or emergency situation, but in a policy-making group, it is a valuable tactic to 
promote varying courses of action and quality decision making free from bias and 
groupthink.337  
To promote quality decision making and well-researched conclusions by 
homeland security decision-making groups, leaders should encourage each group 
member to interject objections, criticism, and doubts. It should be done without fear of 
reprisal if opinions differ from the group consensus. Leaders must encourage the group 
members to introduce and debate objections and doubt during all phases of the decision-
making process to mitigate the plan’s vulnerabilities and potential obstacles.338  
Esprit de corps and group cohesiveness is an important attribute in the homeland 
security enterprise but it can discourage members of the group from voicing their own 
thoughts, concerns, and viewpoints. Organizations with a high esprit de corps can instill 
critical thinking and creativity into the organizational culture by promoting and 
encouraging this type of thinking as part of the esprit de corps culture. Homeland 
security decision-making groups should be cohesive, but at the same time, the 
participants should be dissimilar, as well as represent different social, ethnic, economic 
and occupational backgrounds. Methods, such as recruiting from a diverse pool of 
applicants with the ability to think critically, question the agency’s policies, and offer 
solutions to potential vulnerabilities, would help mitigate groupthink and foster a cultural 
change within homeland security organizations struggling with the problem of 
groupthink.339  
336 Lake and Rogan, “Can Obama Keep His Generals in Check in the War Against ISIS?,” 211–213. 
337 Ibid., 210–211. 
338 Ibid., 209–210, 214–216. 
339 Ibid., 209–210. 
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Homeland security leaders and decision-making group members should seek 
outside expert’s advice and discuss the group’s deliberations, findings, and 
recommendations to obtain outside and alternative perspectives. Janis recommended that 
each group member should seek outside input from “trusted associates” and “experts” to 
challenge the views of the core members.340 Outside experts should also be invited to 
meetings to observe the interaction and to offer critical assessment of the plans and 
decisions. Their participation will provide the group, and ultimately, the leadership with 
alternative viewpoints and may reveal issues that the group has not considered or 
dismissed. Outside experts may also reintegrate devil’s advocacy and debate amongst the 
group, and thus, mitigate the groupthink that maybe setting in as members of the group 
becomes more comfortable with each other.341  
Janis stated that whenever the policy or issue involves relations with a rival nation 
or organizations, a sizable bloc of time should be spent surveying all warning signals 
from rivals and constructing alternative scenarios of the rival’s intentions.342 The 
homeland security enterprise can accomplish this review through red teaming or war 
gaming.343 In a 2003 study, the Defense Science Board stated, “We believe red teaming 
is especially important now…Aggressive red teams challenge emerging operational 
concepts in order to discover weaknesses before real adversaries do. Red teaming also 
tempers the complacency that often follows success.”344 
It is important for homeland security to realize that if the issue that the decision-
making group is addressing involves an adversary, the group must continually assess the 
motives, intentions, tactical plans, and capabilities of the opponent. Moreover, the 
decision-making group should analyze the past actions of the enemy to predict future 
events to develop alternative plans to counteract the enemies’ actions. These theoretical 
340 Janis, “Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes,” 
207–224. 
341 Ibid., 213–214. 
342 Ibid., 214–219. 
343 The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), Red Team Handbook. 
344 U.S. Defense Science Board (USDSB), Defense Science Board Task Force on the Role and Status 
of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 1.  
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enemy plans should be tested against the decisions made by the group to identify and 
mitigate vulnerabilities that the opposition could exploit.345  
The UFMCS Red Team Handbook states, “Red teams assist the commander and 
staff with critical and creative thinking and help them avoid groupthink, mirror imaging, 
cultural missteps, and tunnel vision throughout the conduct of operations.”346 Red 
teaming of policies, plans, and security infrastructures mitigates organizational 
vulnerabilities, including groupthink that makes the nation more resilient to exploitation 
by an adversary.347 
Upon reaching a general consensus, the homeland security leader should 
encourage the group to hold a “second chance” meeting at which every member has a 
final chance to repeat the objections discussed during this process and determine if these 
were addressed and still legitimate.348  
C. A FINAL WORD ON GROUPTHINK IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
Only through a thorough reorganization can homeland security ever fulfill its 
promise to the American people. Homeland security must be streamlined and its mission 
must be limited to hazards within the mission space of the agencies within homeland 
security to focus the efforts of the enterprise to counteract threats to this nation.349  
Homeland security reformers must understand that historically the catalyst for 
major reform of the homeland security enterprise and its environment of groupthink has 
occurred only following an extraordinary homeland security crisis.350 In the past, reform 
occurred following the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, the attacks on 
345 U.S. Defense Science Board (USDSB), Defense Science Board Task Force on the Role and Status 
of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 216–218. 
346 The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), Red Team Handbook. 
347 Swanson, “Enhancing Red Team Performance: Driving Measurable Value and Quality Outcomes 
with Process Improvement.” 
348 Ibid., 218–219. 
349 Morton, Next–Generation Homeland Security: Network Federalism and the Course to National 
Preparedness, 14–49, 87–89.  
350 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event 
Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 3 (2007): 1–23. 
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September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina. These tragic incidents enabled homeland 
security reformers to implement policy changes and reform.351 However, since Hurricane 
Katrina, no homeland security event has been grave enough to prompt legitimate long 
standing reform. Had the Boston Marathon Bombing resulted in a greater devastation or 
had it spread to other locations, such as New York City, where the Tsarnaevs intended to 
travel, it may have prompted a restructuring and critical analysis of the homeland security 
enterprise, which has become so influenced by groupthink that at many levels, it has 
become ineffective at protecting the homeland.352  
Janis’s remedies and methods to counteract groupthink would be effective to 
diminish groupthink in homeland security but they will more than likely never be 
employed on a wide scale. Failure to do so stems from the fact that homeland security is a 
convenient repository for political groups in power to employ a great number of 
supporters, who may or may not have any relevant experience. If the homeland security 
enterprise or any of its parts sincerely intends to mitigate the groupthink threat, senior 
leaders need to recognize that the current state of cronyism and political nepotism has 
made the homeland security enterprise into a lumbering behemoth that has great 
difficulty protecting the people of the United States from an ever evolving and fluid 
global threat.353  
Absent the opportunity to initiate significant change, homeland security reformers 
who wish to mitigate groupthink on a case-by-case basis must foster a culture in which 
individuals work together towards the common goal of protecting the homeland. Leaders 
should encourage their employees to play the vital role of devil’s advocate by offering 
alternatives to policies, programs, ideas, and commonly held assumptions in an 
organizational structure that promotes constructive criticism. Homeland security leaders 
can diminish groupthink by initiating an active campaign that employs Janis’s remedies, 
establishes a methodical process for decision-making groups, and encourages critical 
351 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security,” 4–7.  
352 Friedman, “Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,” 77–106.  
353 Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign–Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
207–224. 
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thinking, innovation, and imagination to bolster the national security part of the homeland 
security culture. The internal threat of groupthink must be actively sought out and 
eliminated, while critical thinking and creativity must be embraced to counter the modern 
world’s ever-fluctuating threat picture effectively.  
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